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TOWARD SOCIAL DYNAMICS

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IN THE final analysis I suppose we would agree that the energies of men, from whatever source they flow, furnish the dynamics of society. If society continues in a state of incessant change it is because the energies of human beings are never at rest. As individuals and in groups, humankind are continually seeking, striving, and struggling. If one defines social dynamics as the forces moving society, one begins with the energies of men; if one defines dynamics as the changes in society, one studies the results these energies have wrought.

It is in the social process that individual energies are merged and channeled.[1] Individual energies are merged in the economic process to create an economic order, maintain a changing economic equilibrium and distribute the goods and services by which men nourish their material existence. In the breakdown of order, new issues emerge and the energies of men are channeled in processes of struggle and conflict to arrive at new decisions and new forms of order. Here dynamics range from the use of force to the processes of valuation and revaluation involved in arriving at the rationalizations of a new moral consensus. "Men will rise," wrote Sir John Fortescue in his *Governance of England,* "for lack of goods or for lack of justice. But certainly when they lack goods, they will rise, saying they lack justice."

Certainly the political process in the true Aristotelian sense is the policy making process. In its ultimate range it embraces the open use of force and never are the energies of men more powerfully or more terribly employed than in the co-operation of group conflict. It is a truism that conflict is the ultimate means of registering and consumating social change, but there is no valid estimate of how much of social dynamics is lost in deadlock and how much of the splendid energies of men are wasted in the process.

It is possible that international war may some day be superseded, but conflict itself as a dynamic reoccurring expression of the energies of men in their struggle for decision and order will remain. William E. Gladstone once said: "If no consideration in a political crisis had been addressed to the people of this country except to remember to hate

[1] Individual energies are stimulated and channeled in a hundred different processes to result in a hundred different products. "Society," as Charles H. Cooley has told us in his classic definition, "is a complex of forms or processes each of which is living and growing by interaction with the others, the whole being so unified that what takes place in one part affects all the rest. It is a vast tissue of reciprocal activity, differentiated into innumerable system. . . ." Charles H. Cooley, *The Social Process.* New York: 1918, p. 28.

violence and love order and exercise patience, the liberties of this country would never have been obtained." "Conflict is inevitable," wrote Charles H. Cooley after the first World War, "but we need not assume that we fight in a vacuum nor in any endless cycle of frustration."

DYNAMICS AS THEORY AND AS METHOD

It is now over a hundred years since that strange and prophetic figure, Auguste Comte, strove to reconcile the concepts of order and progress and thus made dynamics a master idea in the theory of human society. Behind him lay the French Revolution, the greatest sequence of social changes the world was to witness until the Russian Revolution, approximately a century and a quarter later. While Comte was publishing his *Cours de Positive Philosiphie* Karl Marx was a student engaged in assimilating the Hegelian dialectic into a philosophy of revolution.

In the new science, statics was to deal with the structural and organizational aspects of society as seen in cross section; dynamics was to deal with succession, sequence and change, in short with the progress of society. Statics showed social harmony in consensus, concurrence and interconnection under the laws of coexistence. The organizational aspects of society were common to all times and places, but nowhere did they become fixed and immutable. "Just as humanity lives on while individuals perish," Cooley was later to write, "so the social organization endures while the particular forms of it pass away."[2] Statics and dynamics were thus interdependent categories, each serving to define and delimit the other. Progress, according to Comte, was the development of social order. While the emergence of social order was to be explained by a process of development, the laws of progress would serve to determine the points of reference in all stages of social organization.

In 1850 Herbert Spencer, then a stripling of 30, published his first book, a work called *Social Statics*. He had seen the term in John Stuart Mill's *Principles of Political Economy*. Later he was to learn that it came from Comte. In a succeeding part of his *Political Economy*, Mills had introduced economic dynamics saying: "We still have to consider the economic conditions of mankind as . . . undergoing progressive changes." Spencer, like Comte, hoped to establish dynamics as a dominant idea. He defined statics in the mechanistic terms of an equilibrium of forces and dynamics in terms of disequilibrium. The end of dynamics was the perfect static state for Spencer conceived of dynamics as the means of advance toward finality, that Utopia of perfect adjustment between individuals and society, society and nature, and society and other societies visualized in his *Social Statics*. In his *First Principles*, however, he concluded that social equilibrium is unattainable in the static form, and only a moving equilibrium is possible.

Under the broad canopy of cosmic processes, Spencer held in Frank Hankin's felicitous phrase that "everything would eventually reach utopian perfection provided we all sat perfectly still and let evolution take its course. . . . Social science was not a guide to action, but a warning to man not to interfere with nature, and a proof that conscious control of social development is impossible." We have long realized that Spencer disregarded at his peril the larger implications in his idea of society's resemblance to an interdependent organism and his view of culture as a super-organic product.

The first cycle of the Founding Fathers was to be completed in 1883 when a 42-year-old American, Lester F. Ward, a paleobotanist of some reputation, published a two-volume work, *Dynamic Sociology*. For Ward, true social science must have its static and dynamic aspects and these categories must refer to both structure and function. Biology, he felt, became a dynamic science only with the advent of Darwin, and sociology would become a dynamic science only if its disciples grasped the process of unceasing

[2] C. H. Cooley, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

change. In our own discipline, sociologists realize that Ward with his dictum that "the desires of men are the forces that move society," his doctrine of social telesis, and his belief in the superiority of the artificial over the natural, anticipated the trends that culminated in pragmatism and the philosophy of social action.

For Ward, statics had as its proper field, "the condition or status of society at the present time or at any past time." He recognized two kinds of dynamics: passive dynamics dealing with the spontaneous changes which society had undergone and active dynamics dealing with purposive change and collective action toward socially determined goals. The first was the subject matter of Pure Sociology, the second of Applied Sociology. The heritage of social Darwinism was to be sloughed off by showing that civilization was an achievement, not an organic growth, that while environment transformed the animal in geologic time, man transformed the environment by prevision and innovation. The dynamics of induced social change were to come from programs of universal education—the extension of all valid knowledge to all the people. Thence, the process would lead from dynamic public opinion to the dynamic social action that leads to progress. In Ward's dynamics the energies of men were to be directed by the intelligence of men. While this characteristically optimistic and American formulation developed no methods for the study of social change, it pointed to the phenomena sociologists must grasp if they meant to analyze the dynamic flow of society.

Social dynamics is both a method of analysis and a body of social theory forever in the making and remaking. To most of our members, I am sure, the bare recital of these trends in the history of our discipline reaffirms the serious challenge to understanding and to mastery implicit in sociology. It was 53 years from Comte to Ward and it has now been 62 years from the time Ward wrote his first great work to our day —a period that has witnessed two world wars, the Russian Revolution, and the Fascist Counter-Revolution. It is but obvious to admit that the more intense the dynamics of our society, the more difficult we find it to develop sound social theory. Sociologists, however, are not content to emulate Abbe Seyés, who when asked what he did during the French Revolution, replied, "I survived!" Sociology will survive as a useful discipline in a dynamic world only if it comes to grips with the essential processes of change, disorganization and reorganization involved in the category of dynamics itself.

CATEGORY AND CONCEPTS

Despite its honorable history, dynamics as a basic category in sociology resembles a whole that by some miracle has survived the progressive destruction of the parts that composed it. Science and criticism have not been kind to the basic doctrines that were comprised in social dynamics. Here as elsewhere theory outran its verification. The philosophy of history, theories of social progress, doctrines of social equilibrium, cultural cycles, stages of social evolution, cycles of change, and catastrophic theories of revolution have all suffered diminution in scope and value. To many the philosophy of history is no longer good history nor good philosophy. Social evolution, once a keystone of dynamics, was written off in 1937 by Alexander Goldenwiser in an article for the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* that concluded: "If there is social evolution, whatever it may be, it is no longer accepted as a process to be contemplated but as a task to be achieved by deliberate and concerted human effort." How many sociologists, I wonder, now feel that there is social evolution apart from the concerted efforts of men.

Those who see social dynamics as a "task to be achieved by deliberate and concerted human effort" are likely to be met with a reminder of the bankruptcy of the concept of social progress. "The progress of humanity," writes the historian of that doctrine, "belongs to the same order of ideas as Providence or personal immortality. It is true or it is false and like them it cannot be proved

true or false. Belief in it is an act of faith."[3] Actually the doctrine of social progress met its demise because it could not accommodate a static system of norms and values to the idea of a dynamic social order. "Rationally considered," writes Carl Becker, "the idea of progress was always at war with its premises. It rests upon the notion of a universe in perpetual flux; yet it carried the implication of finality, for progress seems to be meaningless unless there is movement toward some ultimate objective. But we can picture history as a process making toward an ultimate goal, only if the world is to come to an end when that goal is attained."[4]

Economic theory, however, has retained the category of economic dynamics and has subjected dynamic processes to quantitative analysis. Accordingly it may be of some value to examine the status of dynamics in a kindred discipline.[5]

It was the insight offered by Comte that gave economics an initial impulse to break away from the static assumptions embedded in Adam Smith and Ricardo. In cultural diffusion one good turn deserves another, and many able young sociologists have profited from coming in contact with the materials, the methods and concepts developed in strong seminars now given on economic dynamics. In available statistical data, in the employment of time series and in their attempt at conceptional integration, economists have been able to formulate and test three dynamic ideas; namely, those of economic progress, economic cycles and economic equilibrium.

In economics until recently the doctrine of progress has escaped the doubts of those who accept no norms and know no values. Economic progress was demonstrated in statistical indices as a relatively slow secular trend leading to the maximization of production and increased material well-being. In neo-classical theory which has shaped economic thought in recent generations there were no misgivings as to the future of economic progress. Western man lived in an expanding economy and as Alexander Gourvitch well put it: "Economic growth here appears as self-feeding and self-perpetuating, without assignable limits, through continuous technological progress, growth of capital, expanding markets, and multiplying opportunities for investment."[6]

Some theoretical support was given the doctrine of economic progress by the concept of economic equilibrium, in spite of the fact that equilibrium analysis is essentially static analysis. The concept of a moving equilibrium as developed in economic theory is by no means simple or coherent. If dynamic changes appear in succession, the economy as a whole can never actually be in a position of equilibrium. Yet according to the theory the economy will always be tending or grativating toward such a position. This idea has very concrete implications for it suggests a natural harmony in economic relationships that is self-adjusting.[7] Any dynamic change generates of itself the action of forces tending to counteract its disturbing effects and is thus self-correcting. Add to this the fact that John Bates Clark in the most rigorous use of this method yet developed assumed that equilibrium conditions offered the fullest possible employment of all economic factors including labor. The ultimate challenge to this doctrine of natural harmonies is found in John Maynard Keynes' conclusion that equilibrium positions without full employment exist and can logically be called equilibrium in the sense that they do not of themselves give rise to movements which would tend to bring about conditions of full employment.

Economic dynamics is increasingly becoming concerned with analyses of the cyclical processes of depression and prosperity. The inability to accommodate previous

[3] J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress.* London: 1921, p. 4.

[4] Carl Becker, "Social Progress," *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences.*

[5] I am indebted in this section to the work of John Maurice Clark and Alexander Gourvitch's *Survey of Economic Theory on Technological Change and Employment.* W.P.A. National Research Project. Philadelphia: 1940.

[6] Alexander Gourvitch, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

[7] Gourvitch, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-86, 109-11.

theory to the drastic phenomena treated in cyclical theory is leading to a revaluation in economics—one that is as yet incomplete and unformulated. Accordingly in the doctrine of a moving economic equilibrium, in the theory of economic cycles and in the analysis of the secular trend, economists have developed three methods of approach to economic dynamics that are by no means integrated among themselves.

So far, little success has attended attempts to bridge the gaps between general equilibrium theory, business-cycle theory and theories of economic progress. "The concept of cyclical movements as fluctuations around successive equilibrium positions," writes Alexander Gourvitch, "is theoretically vague."[8] The idea of economic equilibrium also meets sharp challenge in the work of Wesley Clair Mitchell who says he has discovered no evidence of its existence in his studies of business cycles. That is, he finds no evidence of forces which act toward some equilibrium position and stop when that is reached. "In fact, if not in theory," he concludes "a state of change in business conditions is the only *normal* state."[9]

Even more vague has been the more widespread, ill-defined, and less theoretical notion which tends to assign to each stage of the business cycle a distinct function in the onward march of economic development. Any view of the cyclical movement as performing the function of adjustment over time implies that the elasticity of responses to changing conditions, while counteracted at first by a variety of frictions, nevertheless does assert itself after some delay through the succession of several stages of the business cycle. Such theory of the ultimate beneficence of economic cycles finds little support. Especially does it seem contradicted by the fact that in successive cycles the amplitude of the depression phase becames wider so as to suggest in the expressive words of Dennish H. Robertson that, "the tail of one depression, so to speak, does not so easily get bitten off by the head of the next boom."[10] No longer is it assumed that the process of liquidation assures the survival of those enterprises best fitted to survive in terms of general economic welfare.

In short, one may conclude that the effect of the analysis of economic cycles has been to break down the belief in an automatically readjusting equilibrium and to cast doubts on the validity of theories of an economic progress that is self-generating. A dynamic economic order is undercutting the theoretical formulation of economic dynamics. Thus cycle theory has led to the next phase of dynamics, the consideration of rational measures of political and economic control. Sociology can afford to be sympathetic here, for its theoretical formulations are suffering from a similar malady. In economics this has led to the next phase of dynamics. In addition to quantitative departures from static norms, economic theory as John Maurice Clark points out also faces the problem of qualitative changes in the basic institutions of society, in systems of law, of personal liberty and contract, in short of changes in those social norms which offer points of reference from which other changes are measured. Economics has prepared itself for this task as best it might by adding to its armentorium, basic work in the analysis of comparative economic systems in their structure and functioning. This is a beginning comparable to the analysis of various culture types or stages once popular among anthropologists. The theoretical difficulty here is very real, and it must be preceded by descriptive studies of the function of various economic institutions such as markets, central banking, economic control, etc., under various economic systems.

It is with such an overall view of changes in society, its institutions and values that social dynamics should be concerned and it is our assumption that the early strategists of social theory were so concerned when

[8] Gourvitch, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-88.

[9] W. C. Mitchell, *Business Cycles*. New York: 1913, p. 86.

[10] Dennish H. Robertson, *Economic Essays and Addresses*. London: 1931, pp. 124-25.

they divided sociology into statics and dynamics. Any economics or any sociology which cites the basic institutions, the basic social relations or human nature itself as fixed is still working within the limitations of static concepts and assumptions. Such work is needed and desirable, but it should be labeled static analysis and not accepted as adequate theory for the most dynamic of social epochs.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM

The concept of social process represents an important reaction against static theory, shedding additional light on social equilibrium and social movements. It reached an early summation in Charles H. Cooley's *Social Process*. In social interaction, society was viewed as a flow of relations, a changing equilibrium in which individuals and groups act and react upon one another to create new structures and new relations. It is notable that following Small, Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, who in 1921 formulated a battery of social processes as the main instrument of analysis in *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, also gave us the first systematic analysis of social movements—still a necessary introduction to social dynamics, however conceived.

While psychology has not yet made clear the complex relation between individual drives and motivation on the one hand and the system of social norms and values on the other, we must accept both as categories of reality. Any analysis that sees social movements as collective dynamics must integrate these psychological and social categories in a moving equilibrium. This may be suggested by an example applicable to any people. Thus the English, so their critics have sometimes said, are bound to strike continental observers as hypocritical in behavior, not because their morals are low, but because their ideals are high. This is a point of view pregnant with meaning for the dynamic analysis of any society. It is a commonplace developed by sociologists in the study of human relationships that in human society we have both a natural order of things and an ideal scheme of values. It is no denial of this view to add that in spite of science the natural order is not completely understood; and in spite of ethical tensions, the ideal system is never completely realized.

Every social system maintains equilibrium because it is a system of controls. "From the viewpoint of control," writes A. B. Hollingshead, "society is a vast, multiform, organized system of appeals, sanctions, prescriptions, usages, and structures focused upon directing the behavior of its members into culturally defined norms."[11] At first glimpse this view tends to a static conception of all institutions as committed to the maintenance of a given social order and organization. There are, however, two things necessary to complete the picture: first, the striving individuals seeking goals and satisfactions within the system and second the rationalizations that develop out of the norms and values of control. Thus the concept of justice itself may have had its origin in rules and regulations to repress nonconformists; but when rationalized into a system it may hold up norms that make for increased claims of individuals and groups against repression.

Within each social system, as Harold Lasswell has pointed out, individuals are "always widening or narrowing the sum of their claims on society for life, liberty of action, property or deference. For the most part, the position of the individual in relation to society is controlled by influences of which he is unaware but in some measure each believes his personality should be protected from the encroachment of others and can be aggrandized at the expense of others."[12]

Social interaction does not, however, proceed along this path of rugged individualism. Normally, men do not advance their claims individually and singly. Whenever feasible, they unite for the defense, maintenance or advancement of any position or advantage

[11] A. B. Hollingshead, "The Concept of Social Control," *American Sociological Review*. April 1941, p. 220.

[12] Harold Lasswell. "Social Conflict," ***Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.***

which they possess in common; they form an interest group and the term interest is applied to the cause which unites them. Privileged groups may fight to retain what they have but we are also interested in the dynamic phenomena offered by groups struggling for goals as yet unattained. For our purposes, then, the study of social movements offers a most enlightening vista to social dynamics.

Social movements thus considered have their explanation in terms of the reciprocal relations of individuals striving for goals and the systematized scheme of norms and values developed within a given society. As seen from the viewpoint of control, the systematized norms make for social order; seen as unattained ideals, they make for social dynamics, whether the process be called progress or disorganization.

Social movements begin in those groups where the shoe pinches. They are initiated by minorities who feel that their rights have been disregarded or that their claims to power have been denied. The strength of such movements is often to be explained in terms of excessive emotional conditioning. By an indifferent majority, suffragettes, abolitionists, and youth leaders were called fanatics. Actually, their appeals were often made to previously accepted codes, even while the conservatives retorted that nothing had been changed and nobody had been hurt. Social movements then are initiated by minorities whose emotional intensity is often in inverse ratio to their numbers. What they lack in mass they may be said to make up in velocity. Thus minorities attain high momentum in their impact on majorities which by their very indifference lack momentum. Each social movement is preceded by social unrest—a phenomenon that creates tension among the majority. Certain techniques such as the hunger strike have been shown to have a high degree of value in creating this tension. Because they have suffered, agitators, visionaries and idealists go beyond simple claims for justice and equal treatment and see in the triumph of the movement they represent, the promise of a new Utopia. Woman suffrage was to purify politics; the labor movement was to bring economic democracy; and legal prohibition was to institute the universal reign of temperance.

Many social movements have won their way in our society, but not all of them have greatly changed the social equilibrium. Abolitionism won and became Reconstruction. Woman suffrage doubled the electorate and gave each political party state committee women where only committee men had grown before. Temperance became prohibition and prohibition became "law enforcement," until lawlessness forced its repeal. Christianity captured the Roman Empire but it was no longer Apostolic Christianity. By losing its "fanatics" it became respectable and it ended by becoming a new imperial Church, giving rise to the suspicion that the Empire in effect had captured the Christian church. If Christianity had come to power in a democratic world, it would, no doubt, have given us a different equilibrium. Even so, there is the chance that in such a world, the Christian movement would have lacked the dynamic motivation to rise to power.

Why do social movements thus appear to stop short on the brink and fail to carry through to final achievement? The apparent failure of feminism to achieve all that its leaders promised and hoped was due, no doubt, to the fact that women are human beings first and women afterwards. Given a minimum of economic and legal rights, women were reabsorbed in the social fabric and feminism lost its dynamics. Logically speaking, this is the answer to those who fear the Negro movement. Relieved of the proscriptions under which they suffer, Negroes will appear as human beings first and Negroes afterwards. The cause of Negro rights would then be merged with the cause of human rights everywhere.

Generally, it can be said of all social movements except possibly revolutions that while they tilt the social balance upward they are reintegrated in the social equilibrium. Thus to the zealous leaders it must seem that as social movements win, they begin to lose. To win, an intense minority must attract to its cause a majority of the

public, most of whose members are apathetic—if not hostile. As the movement impinges upon the solid mass of the electorate, it tends to lose in velocity what it gains in mass. To jump on a bandwagon is to slow it down.

Not only are the new adherents indifferent as compared to the leaders, but the leadership itself changes. Idealists, honest and visionary, agitate for unpopular causes but when it appears that these causes are likely to win, practical men of affairs take over the movement and administer on the basis of business and politics as usual. The Abolitionist Movement had its William Lloyd Garrison and appealed to a higher law than the constitution, but when it won, Reconstruction furnished carpetbaggers and scalawags, the practical men needed to distribute office, collect the spoils and hold the enfranchised freedmen in line. Business men, bureaucrats, politicians, and lukewarm office holders, as practical men of affairs administer the victorious movements. It is part of the day's work to them.

In retrospect these conclusions seem hard and cruel to those who believe in causes, but obviously they go beyond Pareto's cynical denial of social dynamics. The fluctuation of society around a moving equilibrium is dependent upon the reoccurring forces of social movements. In their intensity, the agitators of social movements overshoot the normal equilibrium of society in their promises of justice and utopia. Soundly based as their claims may be, there are more often claims for basic rights than blue prints for a new Jerusalem.

Since the masses who finally vote approval of these reforms are usually indifferent, it is not surprising that these hopes fall short of realization. In the main, the followers of these movements are satisfied when their immediate demands are met and thereby cease their agitation for long-time goals.

In terms of dynamic social action we can summarize the process at work in these movements. The dynamic is found in the motivation of similarly placed individuals to grasp by group effort at values and rights already assumed by certain classes and groups in society. While the group's attainment of these values may fail to bring about the reconstruction of society visualized by its leaders, it results in the maintenance of a moving equilibrium with a rising trend line in norms and values. This is the significance of social movements in which whole groups rise to new levels as compared to those forms of social mobility in which individuals rise but leave groups as depressed in the social scale as before.

DYNAMICS AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION

No statement of social movements, however complete, can do more than illustrate one phase of the complex range of dynamics. None of society's great changes, however widespread and beneficial have ever proved to be final. The search for a fixed human nature operating in conjunction with a fixed social order appears in modern science to have suffered the fate of all attempts to establish the absolute. Individuals in society are in continuous interaction adjusting and readjusting to new situations, generating new values and new patterns of order. The resultant in this interation may be classes, factions, sects, gangs, minority groupings, regions, sections, or nations, but the basic process remains the integration of individuals in groups and of groups in the total society.

A persistent human problem has been that of maintaining order in the midst of dynamics. The mores and the patterns of culture furnish the static aspects of society but within the social organization we increasingly realize that continuous pressures are making for disorganization and reorganization. Over periods the process proceeds slowly and regularly, but when the tempo increases we become conscious of the conflict of changing values. In such periods doctrines of natural harmony meet sharp challenge. As belief in a self-adjusting equilibrium grows weaker reemphasis is directed to the fact that many equilibrium devices are the planned products of human intelligence. Whenever they are needed, the view is advanced that others can be developed. In a relatively few periods in history the ultimate range of social dynamics has been found in that sudden and drastic form of reorganization known as revolution. Only

when breakdown reaches the point where the prevailing organization fails to function and attempts at social reform are frustrated is it likely that masses of the population will rise, seeking by force to replace old mores and forms of legality by new values. Even here the logic implicit in dynamics is to press on to social integration around new values or else to risk a return to the old. The essence of dynamics is change, but if dynamics is defined in terms of values, the trend is not toward chaos but toward the development of new forms of order.

The static point of view is not only a logical necessity; it follows from the successive levels of integration attained in the dynamic process. Archimedes asked for a fulcrum that he might move the world. Where everything is in flux, where nothing is and everything is becoming, science also needs a fixed point from which to view social movement. While it is essentially logical to view social statics as an abstraction from dynamics, it seems clear that the development of static analysis must come first. Even so, the rationalization of any system of social order may await the end of the dynamics that produced the system.

Thus Walton Hamilton writes:

> The feudal regime was an empirical sort of an affair; men of iron lorded it over underlings as they could, yielded to their betters as they were compelled and maintained such law and order as the times allowed; but with its passing, its sprawling arrangements and befuddled functions were turned into an office and estate ordained of God. In the days of the Tudors, kings were kings without any dialectical to-do about it; the overneat statement of the divine right of kings had to wait the decadent monarchy of the Stuarts. The tangled thing called capitalism was never created by design or cut to be a blue print; but now that it is here, contemporary schoolmen have intellectualized it into a purposive and self-regulating instrument of the general welfare.[13]

Men striving in society find the impetus to dynamics in (1) crises involving the breakdown of social order, (2) in the development of invention and technology, and (3) in the progressive creation of new values involving the demand for new forms of order. Inventions have made war more terrible and it is held by some that advancing technology has made cyclical unemployment more certain. This is social change but an equally dynamic interpretation will seek to explain the emergence of new social structures and forms of organization. It seems safe to venture that the great dynamics of our times will prove to be mass fear of unemployment and mass fear of future wars. They too can be given psycho-social analysis in terms of forces making toward the development of new forms of social order.

Sociology has tended to avoid the analysis of values but an adequate social dynamics will grasp the nettle of progress by showing how a dynamic society generates social values as it moves. The solution of the dilemma offered by the concept of progress is to state that any dynamic society must be measured by dynamic rather than by static values. These values cannot be posited in advance; they are generated by society as it changes in the development of new structures and new equilibria. Thus mass unemployment generates within a society a new concept of human rights—the right to employment. This right is first assumed, then demanded, and finally given legal sanction. Whether attainable or not, the search for this goal offers a major social dynamic whose wealth of data will not be adequately exploited by calculating the length of cultural lag between the appearance of unemployment and the creation of machinery to cope with it.

If any society after vigorous striving, by happy chance beyond imagination attained the values set forth in democracy or Christianity, its members would not cease from striving. By then they would have developed new values. In the mass fear of war and of unemployment, society projects ahead of itself assumed values of full employment and international organization. Regardless of whether these desired objects are to lead us to chaos or to security, they suggest the social dynamics—the changing goals and the changing motivation—generated within a changing society.

[13] Walton Hale Hamilton, "Social Institutions," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.*