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THE RELATION OF SOCIAL THEORY TO PUBLIC POLICY

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“To censure,” said Demosthenes, “is easy, and in the power of every man: but the true counsellor should point out conduct which the present exigence demands.”

It is an interesting circumstance that the makers of social theory in all generations have aimed to be true counselors in the sense contemplated by the Athenian orator. Like other men, they have reacted to the greater exigencies of their day. With fellow-citizens they have played their part in the collective struggle for existence and advantage. By one sort of thinking or another, their theories have been derived, at least in part, from observations or reflections upon large issues of public policy, and upon public policy they have left an impression by no means insignificant.

If their counsel has been not always wise, not always salutary, imperfect knowledge, more than any defect of patriotism, has been at fault. Until social theory became sociology, it was highly a priori and speculative. A conclusion much desired for fortifying a policy predetermined more often than not was the actual base of intellectual operations. Knowing what he ought to prove for the glory and safety of the state, the pragmatic political philosopher discovered adequate premises therefor as unerringly as any soothsayer to Cyrus or Alexander found

the right flock of birds to deliver a prognosis of promise for expeditions then afoot.

It would be rash to assume that speculative methods have forever faded with the nobler intellects that used them "into the infinite azure of the past." In an age which is witnessing, in supposedly educated circles, a revival of every cult of magic and demonism known among men from Gadara to Salem, we cannot feel sure that any absurdity or obsession may not again mask under the austere name of "science." But for the time being, social theory of the speculative sort is discredited. The very name "sociology" was invented and is used to lay stress upon inductive method. To find the facts first, to sort and array them with a fine discrimination, to observe differences, resemblances, and dimensions closely, to generalize with caution, and only then to ask what suggestions, if any, the approximations to truth so obtained offer us for guidance in private and in public conduct, is now the only reputable procedure among students of social, as of physical, phenomena.

Of the founders of sociology it may be said that in a pre-eminent degree their interest in practical affairs was deep and continuous and directed upon the weightier matters of the law. The "mint, annise, and cummin" of administrative reform they did not despise, but, one and all, they entertained the high ambition to mould public policy. Comte wrote *The Positive Philosophy* in part that he might fashion *The Positive Polity*. Spencer never lost sight of his initial purpose to formulate the principles of justice. Walter Bagehot, in whatever by-way of science or criticism he wandered, did not forget that his self-appointed task was to increase and heighten in the public life of his age that "animated moderation" which he held to be the unique excellence of English character.

We cannot doubt that these men, like their forerunners, were tempted to lay philosophical foundations in the good old manner, for preconceived political systems. That they never dallied with the temptation need not be claimed. But to whatever extent they yielded to it, they impaired the value of their total achievement. Their abiding fame rests upon so much of their ac-

cumulation and classification of facts as was unprejudiced and so much of their generalization as was inductive in quality. If any one of the three did not fully realize that his contribution to thought would be so measured, he at least did not fail to shape his intellectual life by scientific standards. In mature years each one frankly revised the dogmatic political creed of his youth by the objective light of abundant knowledge. Comte began as the fervid disciple of the social revolutionist Saint Simon. He became the prophet of a progress as smoothly projected as a parabolic curve. Spencer's hatred of aggression proclaimed in *Letters on the Proper Sphere of Government* was formulated in his earliest book in the language of finality. But, mellowed by his historical study of social evolution, the author of *Social Statics* arrived at a perfect understanding of the part that war has played in political integration, and a clear perception that equal liberty can never be established among men while militarism survives. Bagehot, described by the friend of his college days as an intellectually arrogant and supercilious youth, became *par excellence* the scientific man of the world, the trusted adviser of ministers of state and the one psychologist who has ever succeeded in explaining the mind of the average Englishman to the average English mind.

To recall these origins of inductive social theory is to realize that the work remembered was not only ground-clearing and ground-breaking; it was also superlatively constructive.

Comte not only insisted that completeness of description is a requisite of method, he also, making contribution, demonstrated the successive mutations of the human mind. Going forth from the barbaric feast of credulity, to be "long fed on boundless hope" of metaphysic, the race of man must, in the end, content itself with the "simpler fare" of verifiable knowledge. In that day reason may qualify the passions which dogma has denounced and damned, but never yet repressed.

Spencer's sociological theories were formulated as a part of his evolutionist conception of the world. That conception has become an integral part of the mental equipment of every educated man. Those writers who would convince us that

Spencer is forgotten are of all philosophers most miserable. They must either avoid the post-Spencerian problems or think about them in terms of Spencerian ideas.

As Comte taught students of social science to expend their energies within confines of the knowable; as Spencer compelled them to see every process as evolution or dissolution; so Bagehot, examining more closely than any predecessor had done the strictly social phenomenon of a collective struggle for existence, demonstrated, once for all, that in the last analysis sociological explanation is psychological interpretation. Bagehot, rather than Tarde, was the true founder of the so-called psychological school. *Physics and Politics* is one of those rare, excessively rare, books that the critic who has some sense of moral responsibility may daringly call original. As sociology, the chapters on the "Preliminary Age" and "Nation Making" forestall *Les lois de l'imitation*. As psychology, the chapter on "The Uses of Conflict" more than foreshadows some of the brilliant generalizations that we associate with the name of William James. And he would be a remarkable writer indeed who, desiring to set forth the social interplay of instinct, habit, and reason, could put it all so luminously as Bagehot has put it in the chapter on "Government by Discussion."

It is a fair presumption that work of such enduring influence upon theory has not yet spent its practical power in suggestion. It is reasonable to think that, were we now to re-examine it, we might find it still an unexhausted fund of wisdom, as of correlated knowledge. It may afford us guidance today, not less than it did yesterday, for a rational criticism of public policy. To that possibility, it may be well to give attention.

The problems of public policy do not become simpler with advancing civilization. To speak for the moment of our own nation, the questions that vex us are of bewildering variety and complexity: questions of territorial expansion and of rule over alien peoples; questions arising out of race conflict within our older continental domain; questions of the restriction of immigration, of the centralization or the distribution of administrative authority, of the concentration or the diffusion of

economic power. Well may the skeptic ask if any science of human relations, however wide its generalizations, can offer even presumptive answers to questions so far-reaching and so diverse. Yet every citizen, whether he be instructed or ignorant, is expected to help answer them.

Before we admit that the objection is fatal, let us remember that an overshadowing question has still to be named, and that when one question overshadows all others the relative values of the others are determined. That question is the world-old query—older than science, older than any record of history—the question, “Is it War or Peace?”

After ten thousand years of so-called progress, is reason still so ineffective against instinct that only minor issues can be removed from fields of battle to arenas of intellectual conflict? Must sovereignty—the ultimate social control—forever prove and declare itself in government by slaughter, or may international relations also be brought under government by discussion? By this “previous question” of world-politics every question of domestic politics is qualified. With war a possibility, the restriction of immigration is one problem; with war made impossible it would become an entirely different problem. A further democratizing of the social order, which might be safe if world-peace were assured, may be fraught with peril if the greater nations are again to challenge one another’s right to live. It is not an accident that international socialism is unalterably opposed to militarism under every guise and pretense.

These considerations might be dismissed as academic if it were certain that war must indefinitely continue. Happily that is not the fact. Utopian and wholly ineffective not longer ago than the generation of Fox and Penn, opposition to war has become organized and determined. The antagonism of nearly ten millions of socialistic voters is formidable. The best professional and business intellects of the world are ranging themselves on the side of peace. Funds with which to wage aggressive attack upon eradicable causes of war have been provided.

It is true that public appreciation of Mr. Carnegie’s gift

has been qualified by skepticism. There are sincere and able men who doubt if the cessation of war should be desired. They exalt its disciplinary value, believing that the world yet needs a measure of sacrifice, of daring, of endurance and of superiority to materialistic aims which only war can give. A larger number of men, also sincere and able, reject every defense of war as invalid, but are incredulous when ways and means of disarmament are proposed.

It is precisely upon these two interpellations, namely, the desirability of world-peace and its possibility, that the verdict of sociology may rightly be demanded and should carry weight. And as a sort of preliminary report, the conclusions of Spencer and of Bagehot assuredly deserve a profoundly respectful consideration.

As all students of Spencer know, his most important sociological generalizations pertain to the characteristic differences between what he calls the militant and the industrial types of society. His theory of social causation is stated mainly in terms of war-habit and peace-habit. And, like Mr. Carnegie, who was his loyal friend, Mr. Spencer looked upon war as the most monstrous of social ills, as the most formidable obstacle to the complete evolution of man. Mr. Bagehot, on his part, believed that in government by discussion we have an agency attained through immeasurable effort and suffering for the inhibition of hasty action, for the subordination of brutal passion to a reasonable expediency, for the final settlement of disputes by reason instead of force. Surely, then, we should ask these scouts of inductive social science whether in their opinion the cessation of war at the present stage of social evolution is a thing to be desired, and, if it is, by what policies the consummation may be attained.

Sentiment, doubtless, and the abhorrence of suffering move most of those who are participating in peace efforts now. Mr. Spencer shared these feelings, but he did not rest his case against militarism upon sentiment alone. His faith was in the improvability of man, the final and superlative product of cosmic evolution. He saw that improvement involves adaptation to conditions on which life depends, and ever nicer adjustments

of differing interests. He believed that improvement consists in an expanding sympathy of man for man, a continuing differentiation of powers, a better and always better co-ordination of life-activities and therewith an ever-deepening joy of living. It has proceeded through a social process. In this process war has played a great and recurring part. In breaking down the barriers that separated primitive men, in bringing savage camps together into tribes, in hammering tribes together into nations, war was inevitable and it was useful. Nevertheless, war achieves results through frightful cost and waste. It is incompatible with those more delicate processes of evolution which we associate, or should associate, with high civilization. This is a point of such fundamental importance, and the Spencerian demonstration of it is so complete and so irrefutable, that we may well linger for a moment to note wherein the demonstration consists.

Evolution is simple or compound.

Simple evolution is swift, direct and business-like. It occurs whenever a group of units of any kind, from white-hot iron to the professors of a faculty, discharge energy promptly and without indirection. Let the heated iron be cooled with least possible waste of time and in the most economical way. The molecules will draw together. Integration, the initial process in evolution, will quickly be completed. There will be no secondary, no incidental changes. Close crystallization will uniformly characterize the mass. There will be no differentiation. The product will be a bar of iron contracted, instead of expanded; nothing more. Let professors attend strictly to the business of teaching, withholding no energy that can freely be discharged upon the environing student mind. Let there be no day-dreaming and no sauntering, no dallying with research by the way, nor idle discussion of the cosmic, or the social, order. As before, there will be integration. The units of the mass will get together. There will be no disturbing differences of opinion, no disquieting differentiations of aptitude or ability. The product will be a coherent, standardized, teaching force, depend-

able to turn out standardized Masters of Arts and intellectually pasteurized Doctors of Philosophy, at a minimum unit cost.

Compound evolution is slow, tortuous, uncertain, halting, and unbusiness-like to the last degree. Energy, instead of discharging itself in a straightforward way, goes maundering about in crooked currents and incalculable eddies. Some Quixotic mind imagines that it would be interesting to trifle with the cooling bar of iron. He interferes with the simplicity of its habits, with the honest promptitude of its crystallization, exposing it to charcoal fumes, hammering it on an anvil, thrusting it now and again into boiling oil, reheating it in his forge and hammering it some more. Very slowly its molecules draw together. They arrange themselves in strange, fibrous shapes, no two alike. Infinitely minute changes work their way upon and through that iron bar. It integrates, but it also differentiates. It becomes tense, pliant, elastic, vibrant. It sings, when you strike it, with a clear full note, and the Quixotic workman, touching it lightly with one last tap of his hammer, no longer calls it a bar of iron; it has become a Damascus blade. Quixotic faculties there have been, teaching effectively but not too much; not incoherent and not anarchistic, though united by little else than a common interest in intellectual pursuits and a kindly thoughtfulness of man for man. Their energy has freely been given to their chief task, instruction; but some of it, unguarded, has escaped into by-ways of science or creative thought. Exposed to the play of many forces, not always equal or alike, members of such faculties have become different from one another. They have become individuals, each with his own view of life and its problems, each with his own distinctive work and record of achievement. Some of them have become absent-minded and detached, some absorbed in researches which neither colleague nor intrusive tourist could fully comprehend. This compound evolution of the loosely integrated faculty has, therefore, been scandalously irregular, and costly withal. It has made the business man thank God that he, at least, is not as these professors are. And yet, because of it, and by means of it, and chiefly through its very irregularity and freedom, have those

discoveries been made which have multiplied the business man's thousands and millions into billions of ingots of good red gold. Through and by means of it students have been tempered and tested as well as taught, and sent forth into life to be leaders of men. Above all, this idling compound evolution, seemingly so loose and irresponsible, has sustained the pristine faith of man, which happily shall live when every other faith is dead, the faith, to-wit, that the world is still "full of a number of things."

All this is but a way of saying that growth, and the art which simulates growth, are not manufacture. Nature knows nothing of standardization. Within some given range of variation she creates types, that is to say, resemblances, but no two individuals are precisely alike. But growth, with its possibilities of correlated difference, of diversity in unity, requires freedom and takes time. It can be hastened, but only with some sacrifice of results. Some strength of fiber, some delicacy of adaptation, is missed. Hastened evolution is crude evolution. Massiveness of parts and brutality of power may be attained, but not completeness of life.

Now of all ways of hastening social evolution, war is the most obvious, the most effective, the most absolutely business-like. A well-organized and well-drilled army is the best example of standardization that we know. Conquest and a rigorous military rule over conquered foes are the quickest way to integrate and standardize vast populations. The product is a militaristic empire. It is massive and imposing. It brings together the materials from which civilization may be evolved, but it is not itself an example of compound evolution. The notion that war can perfect the internal adaptations of national life, the finer adjustments of sectional, racial, or class interests, has no historical justification. Two concrete illustrations will suffice.

Writing of Bismarck's inflexible purpose to consolidate the German empire, Emile Ollivier, minister to Napoleon III, says:

The cause of the Franco-German conflict was one of those artificial fatalities born of false conceptions and the unwholesome ambitions of statesmen, which time might wear out, transform, and often extinguish.

But there existed a man to whom it imported much that this factitious fatality should subsist, and should finally burst forth into war. It was this puissant genius, unwilling to leave to time the glory of accomplishing the task of unification, the triumph of which would have been inevitable, who wished to make short work of evolution and impose upon the present what the future would have freely established, and to keep for himself the glory that his successors might have shared.

And M. Ollivier might have added that the ceaseless activities of a generation of statesmen and writers have not sufficed to complete in the hearts of the German people that unification by divine right which was outwardly and politically established by Bismarck's crass attempt to hasten social evolution.

Can it be said that the attempt of our southern brethren to solve by war, or of the federal government to solve by the essentially militaristic policies of reconstruction, the terrible problem of race interests were more successful? Can any sane man expect that that problem will ever be solved in any other way than through the infinitely slow process of a social evolution so complex as to baffle analysis?

This, then, is the evolutionist's case against war. It can hasten social integration, but in the measure that it succeeds, it prevents or postpones those finer and endlessly varied adaptations which require freedom and time, and upon which completeness of life depends. War has rudely assembled the factors of civilization, but the possible recurrence of war menaces civilization from this time forth.

Can war then be outlawed and generally prevented? These terms are used advisedly, because no wrong has ever been completely abolished by penalizing it, or by adopting resolutions to discountenance it. We do not, however, on that account think it useless to penalize or to resolve.

I suppose that there is substantial agreement among economists and historians that the prevailing causes of war have been hunger and greed. Primitive men, made desperate by impending famine, have pushed into productive regions already occupied, there to contend for a share of nature's bounty. Modern men do as savage and barbarian did, but in ways so devious that the actual process is rarely seen or understood. Whole

peoples or nations no longer move *en masse*, but, like the ancient Aryans at springtime, of whom Festus, describing the *ver sacrum*, tells us, they mitigate the bitter economic struggle by sending forth their youth and maidens into distant parts. Nations that live, grow. They must work more intensely, keying up the strings of life to higher pitch, or they must expand. Either way, the struggle for existence within nations becomes a struggle for advantage among nations. Emigrants from one may not be welcomed as immigrants by another. Colonization is an intrusion of the strong upon the weak. An acceleration of domestic industry is correlated with an expansion of foreign trade. With colonies and profit by trade, greed enters, adding its insatiable demands to those of primal human need.

These conditions create tension and provoke contention. They do not, however, inevitably produce war. The sociologist may go far with economist and historian in recognizing economic causes in history, but he may not lose sight of other factors, which it is peculiarly the province of his own science to analyze and evaluate.

These factors are psychological, and without their co-operation war does not begin. The passions of men must be consolidated. Consuming hatred or fierce exaltation must merge individual wills in the collective fury of the psychologic crowd. Even then war does not follow if the fury merely bursts. An explosion may make hell writ small, and war is hell writ large, but there resemblance ends. An explosion in the open does no work, and war is systematic work. To make war, the public fury must so far be controlled that it can discharge itself only through the mechanism of a military organization, in a series of regulated explosions, directed upon a definite object, until its infernal task is done.

Failure to remember this incontrovertible fact has had unfortunate consequences for historical theory and for political ethics. How does the control of public wrath arise? In what does it consist? Through what agents or agencies does it direct this fearful power, dissipating it in peace, or aggregating it for war?

Answer to these questions I find in Bagehot's chapters on "Nation Making," and it is at variance with those notions of the insignificance of great men in history which, for twenty years or more, have reigned unchallenged in the domain of historical criticism.

A nation is more than a population. Millions of individuals, differing one from another, compose it; yet, although not standardized, they are alike. In ways not easy to describe, Englishmen are Englishmen and Frenchmen are Frenchmen. Their resemblances are not merely physical. Englishmen are blue-eyed and dark-eyed, florid and brunette. Nor are they merely racial. The Frenchman may be Picard or Gascon, Breton or Provençal. The similarities that we note lie within a well-defined range of mental facts. They are not phenomena of instinct, nor yet of reason. If men were creatures of instinct only, that is, if all their activities were narrowly determined by heredity and began at birth, there would be no distinctions of nationality. Or, if we never saw Englishmen or Frenchmen, nor heard them talk, and if we knew them only by scientific writings, we could not easily tell them apart. The resemblances that constitute national type or national character are tricks of expression, ways of doing things, preferences and antipathies, criteria of taste, views of life and conduct. They were not imparted at birth; they have all been learned. They cannot be discarded at will; they are things of habit.

Now habits are acquired, we say, by doing things or thinking things many times over. That is true, but it is not all. The repetitions that make up habit are imitations; they are copies of models or examples. Many of our elemental and most useful habits are imitations of parents; but plainly, if we imitated parents only, there would be no national traits, and, in the strict sense of the word, no nations. There would be only some millions of families, each abiding by its own mental and moral law. National habits, and therefore national traits and character, are copies of those relatively conspicuous models that are widely imitated, irrespective of kinship; imitated locally at first, perhaps, but at length throughout a population.

If so much be granted, a further and profoundly significant

truth is granted by implication. Conspicuous or dynamic men, who become models to thousands or millions of their fellows, are true social causes, and centers of social control. As they think, the multitude thinks; as they do, the multitude does, and for the most part unconsciously, every man believing that he thinks or acts spontaneously, and because it is his nature to think or to act so, and not otherwise.

Is not the conclusion obvious? Men in positions of authority, whether, as they believe, by divine right, or, as others think, by human choice, are necessarily conspicuous. Often they are men of power, and whether they would have it so or not, their decisions become to some extent the popular decision, and their voice becomes in part the people's voice. Without dictation or argument, and solely because their choice is spontaneously copied and their course of action is uncritically followed by multitudes that swear the choice was theirs, these men control and controlling direct, the public complaisance and the public wrath. In the final throwing of the dice of fate, they are causes of peace and war.

From this sober conclusion of inductive science I confess I see no escape. That it is in harmony with an unsophisticated moral prejudice is not, I wish to believe, a reason for distrusting it. The conscience of civilized mankind has never yet admitted that deliberately declared war has been irresponsibly begun. Rather has it held, that great men in all ages, as moulders of opinion and ministers of state, have been moral agents, rightly to be branded with infamy when, for their own aggrandizement or glory, they have drawn the sword.

One rule of policy then, it would seem, may fairly be derived from sociological theory for the discouragement of war. It is right and expedient to teach that exceptional men, and especially all emperors and presidents and ministers of state, are not puppets of the *Zeitgeist*, but, in a scientific sense of the word, are true social causes, and, as such, are morally responsible for the maintenance of peace.

Beyond policies to restrain the makers of war, are there policies which might render the making of war more difficult?

The conditions preventive or inhibitive of war have been

three, namely: isolation, the inclusion of minor states within confederations or imperial systems, and the so-called balance of power.

In the past mere inaccessibility of territory has assured the relatively peaceful development of many peoples, among whom some have made priceless contributions to civilization. There are no inaccessible nations now. Political integration has continually widened the areas within which domestic peace prevails, and the work is so far done that no important lands or peoples remain to be appropriated. Further integration will be redistributive only. There remains the balance of power, as the one important objective condition upon which the maintenance of peace will largely depend.

I am using the term in a general or descriptive, not a technical or diplomatic, sense. I mean by it political forces in approximate equilibrium throughout the world. In this sense the balance of power is a sociological phenomenon of peculiar interest, for two reasons.

First, it is interesting because of its nature or composition. It is a distribution of forces roughly in accordance with what the mathematician calls "chance occurrence." If as many as a thousand shots are fired at a target, those that miss the bull's-eye are distributed about it with curious regularity. Of those that miss it by three inches, about as many will hit above as below, about as many to the left as to the right. Of those that miss it by six inches, about as many will hit right as left, about as many below as above. In like manner a balance of power is a symmetrical distribution of forces about a central point. An international balance of power exists when, with reference to any interest or question upon which states may differ, as many strong powers range themselves on one side as on the other, and the weak ones are symmetrically distributed with reference to the strong ones.

Does this bit of exposition seem too elementary or too academic to bring into a discussion of world-peace? Let me then ask if a corollary from the principle stated may be taken for granted? The probability of a symmetrical distribution of shots or of forces about a central point increases with their

number. Fifty shots about a bull's-eye would not be so regularly distributed as a thousand. A million shots would make a nearly circular pattern. If, then, an International Court of Arbitral Justice should be established at the Hague, or elsewhere, would the chances that the political forces represented there would remain in approximate balance be increased, if, meanwhile, a number of the now independent small states of Europe and the East should be absorbed in one or more of the great imperial systems? Or need we fear that the chances of equilibrium would be diminished if one or two of the more heterogeneous imperial systems should some day be resolved into independent states, each relatively homogeneous and individual?

The balance of power is of interest, secondly, because it is correlated with government by discussion. Bagehot's chapter on this subject deals chiefly with the nature of such government and its consequences. Like compound evolution, government by discussion is a slow, irregular, and unbusiness-like procedure: and therein lies its value. It inhibits ill-considered action. It gives passion time to cool, it makes for moderation and for poise. Bagehot does, however, ask how government by discussion arises. His answer is, on the whole, the least satisfactory part of his book, but it is essentially correct. Government by discussion arose, he says, in those nations that had a polity, that is to say, a constitution. Greeks and Germans had what Aristotle calls the mixed government. King, aristocracy, and freemen participated in it. Here, then, were distinct political forces in balance, and because they were in balance they had to talk before they could act.

Our modern account of reason and its relations to instinct enables us to generalize Mr. Bagehot's guess and to verify it. Government by discussion depends upon a balance of power and necessarily proceeds from it. It is a social expansion of the reasoning processes of the individual mind.

Reasoning begins when instinct fails or is inhibited. So long as we can confidently act, we do not argue, but when we face conditions abounding in uncertainty or when we are confronted by alternative possibilities, we first hesitate, then feel our way, then guess, and at length venture to reason. Reason-

ing, accordingly, is that action of the mind to which we resort when the possibilities before us and about us are distributed substantially according to the law of chance occurrence, or, as the mathematician would say, in accordance with "the normal curve" of random frequency. The moment the curve is obviously skewed, we decide. If it is obviously skewed from the beginning, by bias, or interest, by prejudice, authority, or coercion, our reasoning is futile or imperfect. So, in the state, if any interest or coalition of interests is dominant and can act promptly, it rules by absolutist methods. Whether it is benevolent or cruel, it wastes neither time nor resources upon government by discussion. But if interests are innumerable, and so distributed as to offset one another, and if no great bias or overweighing anywhere appears, government by discussion inevitably arises. The interests can get together only if they talk. So, too, in international relations. If in coming years these shall be adjusted by reason instead of by force, by arbitration instead of by war, it will be because a true balance of power has been attained. If any one power or coalition of powers shall be able to dictate, it will also rule, and the appeal to reason will be vain.

By what policies can an equilibrium of international power be established? I shall only name those that the foregoing considerations suggest, and not attempt to describe or to analyze them. They must of course be policies that will tend both to differentiate interests and to disintegrate coalitions of power that create an overwhelming preponderance of strength. The great superiorities that now preclude effective government by discussion throughout the world are, (1) technical proficiency based on scientific knowledge, and (2) concentrated economic power. If we sincerely wish for peace, we must be willing to see a vast equalizing of industrial efficiency between the East and the West. We must also welcome every change that tends to bring about a fairer apportionment of natural resources among nations and within them, and a more equal distribution of wealth. If these conditions can be met, there will be a Parliament of Man. If they cannot be met, a nominal government by discussion will be but a tournament of words.