MATT DESMOND:   Okay, Good afternoon. We should probably get this show on the road. So come on in and settle in. So my name is Matt Desmond I've the honor of presiding over this retrospective plenary session on TH Marshall's seminal essay "Citizenship and Social Class." This session was organized by Chad Allen Goldberg at the University of Wisconsin Madison. Unfortunately Chad couldn't be with us today because this session happened to fall on the Jewish Sabbath, so you're stuck with me. Marshall's essay needs a little introduction. It was first published in 1950. It was based on a lecture that Marshall gave at Cambridge University the year before, and in his essay Marshall raised four crucial questions. First: Is equal citizenship consistent with the inequalities of social class? Second: Can basic inequality—excuse me, basic equality be, in Marshall's words "Created and preserved without invading the freedom of the competitive market?" Third: Has the historical development of citizenship led to an imbalance between rights and duties? And fourth: Are there limits to the modern drive towards social equality. While citizenship and social class is now more than a half century old, its core conceptions remain, in the words of one panelists Peggy Summers the touchstone for scholarly work on citizenship. Yet the world has changed dramatically since Marshall first formulated his answers, and in keeping with the theme of this year's meeting, "Toward a Sociology of Citizenship," this plenary session will reconsider Marshall's celebrated essay and its contributions in light of subsequent research and the many changes that have taken place since it was written.

We're fortunate enough today to have three very distinguished scholars join us today, each a respected and influential sociologist of citizenship in his or her own right. The first speaker today will be Martin Bulmer, the Professor of Sociology at the University of Surrey in the United Kingdom. He's also director of his departments institute of social research, director of the question bank, an internet resource base at the University of Surrey, editor of the journal "Ethnic and Racial Studies," director of the economic and social research council and survey link scheme, and an academician of the Academy of Learned Societies for the Social Sciences. His research interests include social research methods, the history of the social sciences, the study of ethnicity and race, the application of sociology to public policy, the sociology of social care, among other things. Among his many publications Professor Bulmer has edited "Citizenship Today: The contemporary Relevance of T.H. Marshall," which is published in 1996. And more recently he contributed a chapter on Marshall to "50 Key Sociologists," which is edited by John Scott in 2007.

Our next speaker will be Margaret Peggy Summers, who's a Professor of sociology and history at the University of Michigan. Professor Summers is the inaugural runner of the ASA's first annual Lewis A. Coser Theory Award for Innovation and Agenda Setting in Social Theory. Her research interests include political sociology and law, the sociology of citizenship, of economic—and economic sociology, comparative

history, social and political theory, and the sociology of knowledge. Professor summers has written extensively about citizenship, including an influential 1993 article engaging Marshall's work which was published in ASR, and more recently her 2008 book "Genealogies of Citizenship." She is currently co-authoring a book with Fred Block entitled "Free Market Utopianism."

Our last speaker will Yasmin Soysal. Dr. Soysal is on the staff of the University of Essex in the United Kingdom. She was previously an associate professor of sociology at Harvard, and the past president of the European Sociology Association. Dr. Soysal's research interests include the historical development of contemporary reconfigurations of the nation state and citizenship in Europe, citizenship and education, cultural and political implications of international migrations, and international discourses and regimes of human rights. Among her many numerous publications is the influential book "Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-National Membership in Europe," which was published in 1994. More recently she's edited "Nation, Europe, and the World" with Hanna Schissler in 2005, and she examined "Diversity and Education in France from 1945-2008" with Simona Szakacs in the pages of a journal of interdisciplinary history this summer. We will hear from these three distinguished guests, and the please right afterwards we'll right get to questions, there's microphones on this side and this side, town hall style. So without further ado, Professor Bulmer.

PROFESSOR MARTIN BULMER:  Okay. We're here to talk about this little book "Citizenship and Social Class," which as the chair said was delivered as the Alfred Marshall lectures at the University of Cambridge in 1949, no relationship between the two Marshalls by the way, and was published by Cambridge University Press in 1950 as "Citizenship and Social Class." Republished in 1963 by Heinemann, and there've been later editions as well. It's a remarkable book, and I think it's very praiseworthy. They were having a meeting today to discuss it. I want to start however, by saying how pleased I am to be in Atlanta, and pleased for a rather sort of odd and particular reason which has to do with music. I wanted actually to play some music here, but I thought it was probably too difficult. But one of the songs which influenced me in my youth is connected to today, and I want to start with that. We're all influenced by music in our youth I think, and if you think back to the sixties, the, songs like "A Hard Day's Night," or "Sweet Little Sixteen," or "Tooty Fruity," all bring back certain memories and so on. But the song that I want to evoke is actually a song from the 1860s, not from the 1960s. And that is a song by Henry Clay Work called "Marching Through Georgia," which I was taught by my father when I was very young. And this provides a sort of tangential connection to the American Civil War because my father was seventy three when I was born and I'm now in my late sixties, so he was born in 1870 which takes us back a hundred and forty years, and I guess that this song was actually a pop song in his youth. It was written after the end of the Civil War in 1865, became very popular, and

still remains popular. And that I can't—I'm not going to try to sing it but, if you want to experience it you can go on to Youtube on the world wide web, where there are various interesting versions available, including one which is actually in Japanese, where the tune is rendered quite faithfully but the words are in Japanese. But most of them are in English. And it was of course a song that was written to celebrate the victory of the Union in the Civil War, and particularly the campaign of William—General William T Sherman, in marching from Atlanta to the sea, that was from Atlanta to Savannah. But that was part of a larger march which Sherman undertook, which was very key in actually leading to the Union victory. And this of course gives the song a double edge. Sherman himself grew to detest the song, and it was played whenever he appeared, and he loathed it and tried to forbid it and so on. But it also is a triumphal song for the Yankees about the Yankee victory in the Civil War and what one commentator terms a dirge for the American, for the American South because it was of course celebrating their defeat. And moreover, the features to the campaign, which I want to mention briefly, which lend it a sort of more modern, more modern tinge. Sherman was based in Louisville in Kentucky, and he began this march from Louisville to Nashville in the middle of 1864 and then proceeded from Nashville to—get my geography right, the town in Tennessee... Chattanooga, which is on the border between Tennessee and Georgia, where he defeated the confederate Army. And he then advanced to Atlanta which he reached in July 1864, which was defended by the further Confederate troops. He besieged Atlanta, and he cut off Atlanta from the railway to the North, and he proceeded to cut off Atlanta to railways from the South in the following month. So that by the first of September, the Confederate Army abandoned Atlanta and retreated Northwards. And on the second of September 1864, the Union Army occupied Atlanta, which was by then in flames. Guidebook that I looked at said that Atlanta was the only city in the United States that'd been destroyed in war time. I don't think that's quite true actually, 'cause Sherman went on later to burn down Columbia- well, who, whether it was burned down by him or by the Confederate forces is unclear, but Columbia, South Carolina was also put to the torch in the course of this campaign. But anyway, Sherman and his army got established in Atlanta and they expelled all the inhabitants of Atlanta in order to secure the place, there was then a fairly small population of Atlanta. They fought battles with the Confederate troops 'round Atlanta, but then Sherman conceived the idea of marching through Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina and joining up with Ulysses Grant and his army who were attacking the Confederates in their capital of Richmond. And this is what Sherman wrote about what he proposed to do: "If I move through Georgia, smashing things to the sea instead of being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive. The psychological effect of such a campaign might be even greater than its material impact." As he said about the overall strategy "We are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war." And he went on "If we can march a well appointed army right

through Jefferson Davis's territory, it's a demonstration to the world, foreign and domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot resist. I can make the March and make Georgia howl," And that's exactly what Sherman and his army did. And they aimed to proceed from Atlanta to the sea, i.e. to Savannah, the town—the port on the coast. They didn't face significant opposition from the Confederate army cause Confederate army had gone inland to Tennessee. And Sherman sent George Thomas to do battle with them around Chattanooga and Nashville. He set out to really despoil the economy of the Confederate states, and particularly Georgia and South Carolina, which where, if you like, the bread baskets of those states and the main source of supply to the federal—to the Confederate Army in Virginia. He determined to travel light, so they lived off the land, they didn't take vast amount of equipment with them, and didn't have provisions and so on. And they spent a lot of time burning down anything that had any military significance, and tearing up the railroads. There was a phrase I think called a Sherman necktie which were railroad rails heated up and tied around trees to make the railroad inoperative. So he set out in October 1864, reached Savannah on the twenty second of December 1864, stayed there a month and then moved on into South Carolina, where Columbia got burnt to the ground. Wasn't clear whether this was due to fires started by the retreating Confederate troops or by the people with Sherman – I'm trying to remember the word. Yeah, people called bummers who pursued this policy of destruction as the army progressed. And then in March, by March, the fifteenth I think, 1865 they'd reached Raleigh in North Carolina, but of course—No, sorry, April the fifteenth 1865. But a week previously Robert E. Lee had surrendered unconditionally to Ulysses Grant and the Civil War had come to an end.

Now, what has all this got to do with T.H. Marshall you may say, apart from my desire to recall a song of my youth. Well I think it has a great deal to do with T.H. Marshall because it was a signal event which was part of the Union triumph in the Civil War, and the bringing to the—to end—bringing to the end, as a result of the Civil War, of the institution of slavery in the United States, and that illustrated one of the propositions which Marshall was putting forward about what he called "Civil rights." But in fact civil rights I think will be better expressed as legal rights, and the legal rights to equality of all members of a population. And, although Marshall's book was very closely tied to the British case, and indeed has been criticized precisely on those grounds, that it's too, it's too narrowly British, it can be extrapolated to the United States. He claimed that legal rights had been fully established in Britain in the eighteenth century, and I think one can argue that in the United States this didn't happen until the nineteenth century. Nor am I saying that abolition of slavery was, in any sense a panacea in relation to the African American population of the United States, but I think it was a very significant event. And I'm not tremendously enamored of counterfactuals in history, but I think one counterfactual which is fairly incontroversable is that if the Confederate army had won the Civil War rather than the Union army, slavery would not have been

abolished in the United States at the time it was abolished. It's possible it would've been abolished later, but the course of history would've been very different. And the issue of emancipation was a sticking point in all the negotiations between the Union and Confederate sides in the Civil War. And of course for quite a long time it wasn't at all clear who was gonna win the Civil War and therefore this campaign that Sherman conducted, which wasn't the only factor, but it was a very important factor, in the Civil War coming to an end. Another feature of this which I want to emphasize is the ambivalence which there is about the outcome of the Civil War. I mean it's very easy to sort of present it in, in black and white, but the ambivalence about the song I think very much reflects the issue about what was necessary in order to bring the war to an end. And it's somewhat ironical I think, that a war which was seen as in a sense achieving positive consequences in certain respects, depended upon what I think is not inappropriate to describe actually as state terrorism. I mean we're much preoccupied today with various terrorist threats to the United States of various kinds, but you know, this was state terrorism carried out by one side in the, in the Civil War to make sure that people didn't have the resources with which they can continue to invade, to—engage in war. So one of the questions that this poses was, what was the—was the outcome worth the cost? And in the history of warfare people have also suggested this was one of the first occasions on which such policies were used so deliberately against the population. And analogies have been drawn by English military historian for instance, between what happened in the Civil War and what was then taught in military academies and so on subsequently, and the Nazi invasion of Russia in the 1941, and the way in which—Germany laid waste to the Soviet Union. But I'm not going to go into that, but I think that the—as it were, the costs of bringing about social change in relation to the first of Marshall's three types of citizenship are worth considering and pondering.

Second issue I want to deal with is what made Marshall a sociologist. I mean that's a question which is perhaps of interest to all of us in a way. Because Marshall began, born 1893, and studied history at Cambridge, and graduated in—no he did two years history—and completed the first part of the Tripos in 1914, he planned to have a career in the diplomatic service. And he then went to Germany for the summer vacation in order to learn German, and while he was there learning German the First World War broke out. And all foreign nationals in Germany at the outbreak of the war were then interned, and he spent four years in an internment camp in Germany, returning to Britain in 1918. If you go to Berlin, travel on the S-Bahn, the western terminus of one of the lines is at a place called Ruhleben. And Ruhleben was the site of the internment camp which Marshall lived in, and which is also the title of a book by J Davidson Ketchum, who was a, subsequently a psychology professor at the University of Toronto, and devoted his life to collecting materials about life in this camp, which he published in the late 1960s and which Marshall himself reviewed in the British journal Sociology in its first issue, commenting upon it. If you're interested in Ruhleben there's also a site on

the world wide web which contains a lot of information about, and I believe an archive at the University of Leeds in the UK containing lots of material, lot of biographies and so on of people who were in the camp. The camp was actually in the stables of a race course that was located at Ruhleben. But most commentators on Marshall's life have commented that his experience of living in this camp from the age of twenty to twenty four or so, was a formative one both in exposing him to different sections of society and in shifting him perhaps somewhat from history toward sociology, although that process was a gradual one. The camp was a cross section of society, although probably bias toward people of middle class origin, and Marshall himself was of upper middle class origin. His father was an architect; he lived in central London in Bedford Square. His sister Frances became well known for other reasons and was very much involved in the Bloomsbury Group, she was the husband of Ralph Partridge and a friend of Dora Carrington and Lytton Strachey, and she lived on until nineteen—sorry 2004 I think, and a biography of her has been recently published. She was a very interesting and unconventional figure was quite close to her brother.  But T.H. Marshall came to Britain in 1918, finished his degree in Cambridge, and got a prize fellowship at his college Trinity in Cambridge. Rather akin, Matthew was too modest to say so, but he's currently I think a member of the society of fellows at Harvard, and this was somewhat similar, a kind of competition for bright young academics. And Marshall held this fellowship from 1919 to 1925 and did studies in economic history, and wrote a book about James Watt during that period. He then got a job at the London school of economics, where he spent the rest of his career, and at the London School of Economics he fairly rapidly turned himself into a sociologist. And the point, I think about this that I would like to emphasize most, which is related to the book, is that the book was really a book about social stratification. I mean the book is a book about citizenship, but it's about the connection between ideas about citizenship and social stratification. A book about inequalities in a society which stem from its capitalist structure, and ideas underlying citizenship of equality of treatment and equality of provision. And at the London School of Economics, Marshall taught social stratification, and was an influential supervisor of people who subsequently did important work in that area, I'll mention two of them. One was Ralph Dahrendorph, who came from Germany to study at LSE in the 1940s. Another was David Lockewood, subsequently a leading sociologist at the University of Essex. So that, the contribution that Marshall made to the study of citizenship was integrally linked to his concern with social stratification. But I want to also—mention something connected with this conference which I think sort of reinforces the argument about the experience of Ruhleben which Marshall had. I noticed in Myra Ferree's biography of the ASA President that she herself had spent three years, as an infant in what were referred there as concentration camps, I think it's debatable quite what terminology one uses, in the western United States, in which members of Japanese American families were interned during the second World War, I think first in Arizona

and secondly in Wyoming. This phenomenon was of course studied by sociologists, and it's of interest that the most notable study of this phenomenon was by Dorothy Swaine Thomas, published as "The Spoilage" in 1946 by the University of California Press with Richard Nishimoto. And Dorothy Swaine Thomas was of course the first woman president of the ASA in 1952, a very notable event. And looking through the list of presidents at the front of the program, it was striking that the next woman president, Mira Comorovsky, was not elected until 1973, and after her Alice Rossi in 1983. So that if you like is another local illustration of a theme that Marshall was interested in, namely the extent to which different kinds of equality were established in a society. Now, third point that I want to make, and this is obviously a broad brush approach, and I don't claim the kinds of expertise which the two following speakers had. Third point I want to make is about Marshall's introduction of the idea of social citizenship, because that seems to be the key contribution that the book made—his ideas of legal citizenship and political citizenship, the two, first two stages were important but other people had made them. "By the social element," he said "I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share in the full- to the full, in the social heritage, and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and the social services." And in his later years Marshall spent a good deal of time writing about issues in social policy, which had a resonance in the UK and he was associated with the Social Policy Department at LSE for a time and so on, and, and political issues. It's clear that the lectures were given and the book was published in the context of the post war labor government and the move towards wider social provision, which that, was that entailed. But Marshall was concerned with the relationship between the impulse towards equality in relation to legal, political, and social rights, and the inequalities of social class which stemmed from the rise of capitalism and whether the limits to the advancement of rights on that account. Now in the book that Matthew referred to, which I edited in 1996 with Tony Reese, a distinguished array of sociologists commented on Marshall's formulation and critiqued it. And I should've made clear that there are quite a number of criticisms of Marshall's formulation, both about the historical sequence which he was postulating, whether it was ideal types or some kind of historical development. And that—I haven't deliberately gone into that, because I think that if you're interested in the subject, you're able to read it. I'm also encouraged that there are more books appearing on the subject, for example the one that Margaret has published, another one Cambridge had published by Thomas Janoski. So the subject is still alive and this conference is powerful testimony to the mileage which there is in discussing citizenship. But I want to stop at that point and hand over to the two following speakers. Thank you.

MATT DESMOND:   Thank you so much Professor Bulmer. Our next speaker will be Margaret Peggy Summers.

MARGARET PEGGY SUMMERS:  So this is in honor of you Evie, because it's the second time in my life that I've used PowerPoint, so we'll see how that turns out. I just couldn't let go, so, I wanted to try it. Well it is an honor, a real honor, to be on a panel, commemorating such a towering figure as, as Marshall. His life as Martin Bulmer knows very well, was so exemplary, in both political and moral ways, and I highly recommend people looking at the short biography of him in the 1981 book "The Right to Welfare," which collects some essay of Marshall's that he published after, long after, "Citizenship and Social Class," and which prove many of the critics wrong with respect to his interest in race and power and—very very sensitive to those issues in that collection. But today what I want to do is think out loud about Marhsall from the perspective of one of the chief sources of criticism that his work has received today in the context of our increasingly globalized world. And that is, you know I don't even, well I'll try this... No clock, should've brought a phone. And that is, namely the eclipse or even the redundancy of the exclusionary rights of citizenship as a source of human protection, rights, and dignity, by the universality and cosmopolitanism, of the international human rights regime, which focuses on our personhood rather than on our attachment to any particular nation-state. Now many sociologists have concluded that the Marshallian model of citizenship is redundant because the world we live in is increasingly global, and that we need models of citizenship that can better cope with multiculturalism, ethnic diversity, migration, modern  Diaspora, and so forth. As an alternative to citizenship, human rights appear to offer an attractive body of entitlement and liberties in a global world, and that they contrast sharply with the nationalist—national, nation-state bounded character of citizenship. It's important to note that probably the most influential and path breaking study of this phenomena was—phenomenon, was conducted by my friend and colleague Yasemine Soysal. Among the many strengths of Yasemine's path breaking study, was its empirical and historical grounding. She brought to light something that was actually happening in Germany and Europe, and she gave it a solid causal foundation that was truly paradigm-shifting. What she did not do, but worrying—but unfortunately others have, is lay normative gloss on the phenomenon, by which citizenship is a institution and Marshall by implication are deemed slightly morally suspect for their inherently exclusionary presuppositions, based as they are on the said to be outmoded, bounded nation-state. And from this perspective, human rights by contrast, by virtue of their post-national universality, are deemed morally superior. People have human rights by virtue of being human, regardless of any kind of particular fortuities. To be sure, there is plenty of criticism out there against the human rights regime and human rights as a concept, from its Euro-centrist premises, to its neo-liberal corporate affiliations. But here I want to focus only on the normative valorization of human rights in comparison with citizenship rights. And I'm going to do so by rethinking Marshall from two related angles of vision. The first is briefly look at the historical moment of his monumental intervention. And secondly what

it is that this historical knowledge can provide us today, to generate a theory that I believe is in there- an unspoken thesis within Marhsall himself on human rights. But since it isn't a mystery story sadly, I will put my cards on the table first, and then spend the rest of my minutes trying to persuade you to at least consider the argument. First I want to call into question the universality of human rights, and their greater universality than citizenship rights, by pointing out that their very ontological possibility depends on a much darker etherizing boundary than that between national and non-national citizen and noncitizen. And this is the line between who gets to count as a human, and who is relegated to the para anthropoital status of nonhuman. Arendt, Arendt famously in channeling Goebbels called people who are—who were treated as nonhuman "scum of the earth." Without wanting to fall into competing victimizations here, history and anthropology make it very clear that whereas non-citizenship makes on vulnerable to discrimination, political exclusion, and deportation, being denied inclusion in the human community makes for expendability and targets in whole classes of people for genocide. If the consequences of exclusion by human rights criteria are so much graver than those for citizenship rights, than human rights can hardly be the warm and fuzzy, all embracing, cosmopolitan universals we so readily believe them to be. No less than citizenship than human rights are precarious and conditional, they too set high barriers to inclusion. And it does no justice to human rights to consider them a universal, "natural" phenomenon, given the—Excuse me. It does no justice to human rights to consider them universal and natural. There is nothing natural about human rights, as long as this sorting process between who gets to count as human goes on in a social context. So the implications of my argument are that regardless of citizenship shortcomings, we cannot console ourselves by turning to human rights. Human rights can be held noble as an aspirational discourse of universality, but they provide solace for the pursuit of a sociological foundation for universal inclusion. I'm stipulating in other words, that the causal arrow needs to be reversed, and that we are faced, in a way with a new algebraic puzzle. Being human can no longer be taken as the foundational cause of human rights, because being counted human is itself a conditional outcome of a prior sorting between the included and the excluded from the community of humans. You can't be a rights bearer any more than a citizen unless you already count as a human. So the sociological imperative is in identifying that causal precondition, what is it that makes- what are the criteria that make someone count as human, and thus even a candidate from such a thing as a human right. Here is where I turn to Marshall. Because I believe Marhsall provides the moral and theoretical touchstone for combating this most fundamental of exclusions. And that rather than in opposition to human rights as he's too often framed, Marshall gives us the preconditions for the most fundamental inclusion of all, or what I call "recognition by others as being of equal moral worth, equally worthy of making legitimate claims on each other." Now, let me take you back to his original moment of giving the lectures in 1949 that turned—the lectures that turned of course

into the seminal 1950 text. And how the historicity of that moment carries over to his political stature, should carry over to political stature today. Now, people talk about Marshall in his historical context, but usually it's limited to a discussion of the British social welfare regime that was, that he was very much a part of. To my knowledge, he is rarely, it is rarely noted that he gave those 1949 lectures literally months after the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was signed in, finally signed by a hundred and ninety eight signatories in December of 1948. Like Hannah Arendt, he wrote his treaties on human equality in the aura of the UDHR, just as Karl Polanyi and Franklin Delano Roosevelt wrote. Roosevelt wrote his second bill of rights, which probably most people have never heard of thanks to how we treat social and economic rights. Just as they wrote it in anticipation of what was going to be inevitable from the rise of fascism—the brief rise of fascism and totalitarianism. So implicitly all four of these great figures were questioning the Natural Rights foundation of the UDHR. The UDHR notably has four or five important articles in the twenties somewhere, twenty one, twenty two I forget the numbers, on social and economic rights. However, that— those rights, just as the other articles which include cultural rights, in indeed citizenship rights, and all kinds of great, great little rights, and big rights. They all depend on what is really the foundation of the whole document, which we find of course in the preamble, which is a natural rights foundation, which is that we are rights bearers by virtue of being human. And on top of that, to build a social and economic argument, is a very shaky proposition. So what Arendt and others were doing was focusing, rightly I believe, on the foundation, the natural rights foundation. Now, Arendt, Hannah Arendt famously rejected human rights discourse as founded on the highest ideal of individual freedom endowed by nature. Stripped metaphorically of all of our attachments, classical liberalism finds that when we are shorn of our political attachments, shorn of our social relationships, shorn of our cultural identities, what is left in the state of nature is a naked human as a rights bearer. So that is what we are, amount to. When everything else is gone, our foundational constitution is as a rights bearer. She essentially waved that off, showed how history provided an actual natural experiment to test that proposition. And she found that it had nothing to do with nature, but that in fact without political membership, without citizenship in other words, the world found nothing sacred at all about human—people having these alleged human rights. In fact she argued the paradox of all paradoxes is it turns out that when a person is nothing but a person, in fact they no longer count as persons. That is the great paradox that she points to. Now Marshall doesn't talk about human rights in this essay, but there is no way he was not intensely aware of the process. The UDHR was the culmination of years of struggle, going back to the early forties, and the charter of the Atlantic Charter, and the founding of the, the United Nations in San Francisco. And it was a very, very contentious operation. And Britain was among the most involved. Churchill notably was in there fighting for colonial rights, rights of the colonial power that is. So there's no way that

Marshall wasn't aware of this. Now obviously I don't yet, I hope to someday, have access to finding out if he had—if he wrote anything in his diaries or so forth, in his inner heart. But I think that he is implicitly writing an orthogonal kind of reply alternative—he's not as direct as Arednt, and that—Oh and by the way, it—he himself became director of UNESCO's Social Science Department, isn't that right Martin? So he would—and he certainly experienced war and he knew well about the abuse of human rights. So what I believe is that independently of Arednt, because I doubt—he couldn't have read her first, he too attaches rights of recognition to political and legal citizenship and its institutions. But despite the sequence that he gives us, the historical sequence, which one as I have could call into question—which is, kind of irrelevant in this context, he reverses his historical sequence, he reverses it as far as a normative sequence. And he actually is arguing that because, that we live in a world of modern capitalism, that and that must by definition build on an infrastructure of property rights, the causal arrow has to go from the institutions of social citizenship, to the kinds of rights represented by the UDHR. In other words I believe that he was giving us a thesis of what it is to be human, but talking about social citizenship. And even though his book is explicitly in the context of social democracy and reformism, and—sort of engaging with that discourse that was very much alive in Britain. I choose to read him as also engaging in this dialogue with the human rights development. So what he does by framing citizenship formation as an enduring conflict of warring principles—that's his quote "warring principles," between class inequality and inclusive equality—social equality. Marshall denies the very possibility of there being inherent human or natural rights in a market driven world. As a sociologist, he defined rights bearers as social beings who live not under the threat—not only under the threat of state power, but under the equally fearsome terror of market forces. For the vast majority, exposure to unmediated markets created a level of inequality and vulnerability, then mounted to much more than mere poverty. It led to exclusion from civil society, which for Marshall amounted to social death. So in addition, then, to legal and political membership, one way of saying it is those who are necessary but hardly sufficient conditions, Marshall understood that absent social inclusion, even the state based rights, conveyed by law would essentially become meaningless. Meaningful political rights depend upon social rights, which Marshall defines not in terms of income transfers or welfare assistance, such as he is too often characterized as advocating, but as quote, the same famous quote that Martin gave us "The right to share in the full social heritage, and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society, which in turn means a claim to be accepted as full members of the society," that is as citizens. Now despite the sort of old fashioned language of civilized being, and all that, what he is basically saying—what civilized being meant, what it was essentially a code for was what it is to be human. In other words he distinguishes the civilized from those who are treated as primitive, savage, not even part of the human relationships. Why? Because they do not, they don't carry the

markers of what it is to be human. And here Marshall is recognizing social exclusion as an, real ontological violation of human membership. Without the institutions of social citizenship, social inequalities will outpace formal legal equalities. Without equality of recognition, large swathes of humanity will be deprived of the right to recognition, and cannot live the lives of civilized beings. So if full citizenship requires not just political, but also social inclusion, then the right to livelihood is constitutive of that primary right to membership. Victims of inequality will suffer the social exclusion of non recognition. This is just a brief, surface reading of Marhsall, but from this historical engagement with the UDHR, one clearly reads in Marshall that it is the—that what it is to be human is the equal status that he characterizes as the definition of citizenship, so he is making one and the same equal status which is moral recognition of, Oh I better get to my very, very cool slides. Okay so I think that we can create from, from Marshall a real sociology of human rights, and it would be a three part project. The first concerns the fundamental priority of social, that is social and economic rights. And in comparison to human rights, the human rights discourse, it's quite, quite notable that for Marshall this is the starting point. In the human rights discourse it is, at best contentious. Human rights—Sorry, social and economic rights are either sort of grumpily added as so called second generation rights, they're totally rejected such as by the United States which has—is the only nation among very few that has not ratified the convention on social and economic rights. They are excluded from UNESCO discourse according to our ASA speaker a few years ago in Montreal, one is actually prohibited from including poverty as a human right in—he explained to us. So, that which—none of that makes any sense. Show me a starving person, and I will show you someone who can act as less than a full human. So, that's the first component, is why it is and what it is to put social and economic rights at the foundation. Secondly, and this is what I had hoped to focus on, but as usual outpaced my—my mind outpaced my mouth. And that is that what Marshall gives us is the theory of human rights based on the necessity of public goods. And because of that necessity of public goods he is also by definition making an argument that human rights in modern capitalism require, and his is his language the invasion of contract by status in certain markets. Not all markets, he doesn't care whether contract prevails in exchanging apples, but he cares whether contract prevails entirely in medical care, in education, in social insurance for the unemployed, for the elderly, the disabled, etc. So I do have a theory of public goods that I get from Marshall, and just very briefly: I think that, you have to think of public goods in the—sort of take it out of the hands of the economists who think of public goods as market failures, and instead turn it around and recognize that public goods are those needs, that—are those entities that meet those needs that the market either cannot or will not provide. And what's at stake in identifying rights as public goods is that it puts the focus not on individual rights bearers and whether or not one bears the—adequate threshold of income to count as a social citizen, but rather on the social and institutional arrangements in which the very

possibility of right exists. And I really think that the concept of a right is nothing more than the name that we use for a particular subject position in social and political arrangements in which public goods are protected from the market by state and civil society. And they are universally accessible, and, here's my very cool picture. So, at least I thought so. So what is the difference between a public good and a market commodity? What, why is it that when we have universal health care, if only, it's called a right? And we, go round thinking that as an individual, we're very proud rights bearers. But, in fact that individual rights bearers hasn't moved, nothing's changed in her, or his, individual—Uh oh skull and crossbones—Nothing has changed except—I mean nothing has changed at the level of the individual. Everything has changed at the level of social and political arrangements, and suddenly we, that, what was once a right is now a commodity. It's the same health care delivery, it's the same doctors, it's the same physical structure, but suddenly it is no longer a right. So a right is deeply, deeply unstable, and deeply subject to the social contentions that all—I'm trying to end, by thinking up something to end with instead of what I have. Okay. So that's what I was trying to say, as an ending. That, that those wiggly lines are supposed to be my way of showing how unstable the whole proposition of inclusion really is. And that for Marshall, citizenship was a proxy, it was only, only related to the nation-state at the level of the law and at the level of politics. It was not a nation-state, it was a phenomenon of humanity when it came to social and economic rights. Thank you.

MATT DESMOND:   Treacherous up here. Our last speaker will be Yasemine Soysal.

YASEMINE SOYSAL:  Unlike Martin I don't have a, the childhood memories or the circle reach to base my talk on, but I'm still happy to be in Atlanta and very honored to be part of this panel with my fellow presenters, whose work I've admired long. My talk will address the topic of the panel from the nexus of immigration and citizenship. Partly because, this is the field that my own research moves from, and partly because in the last two decades some of the most productive engagement with Marshall is from— "Nation of Citizenship" came from this scholarship. The scholars who focus on this nexus, revealing both the promises and also the limits of Marshall's view. I will also bring Europe into focus in my discussion; European citizenships compared to their long considered antithesis of US citizenship. They have followed US Marshall's theory much more closely, at least for part of their life course. So I don't want to repeat what has already been elegantly put across by my fellow presenters, but let me recapitulate the main premise of Marshall's theory the way I see it, to start my discussion.

For Marshall rights in themselves did not have any inherent quality. They were means for social inclusion. So social entitlements were particularly crucial for citizen development, because they would prevent social and economic exclusions that civil and political rights simply on their own accord could not. This consequently would ensure

social cohesion and solidarity, as well as productive economy and market. Marshall himself was not so much attentive to the formation of the national content of citizenship, however he was aware to the formation of the—Or he was aware that citizenship, whose history he wished to trace, was by definition national. As he argued, social rights were at the same time rights to share in full in social heritage, the common culture of the national collective. European welfare states have successfully followed this formula for the most part, of the post World War II period. However, in the last few decades, certain developments have unsettled this formula. National citizenship has gone through significant transformations in light of globally driven processes, which affected the very underlying logic of rights and belonging. I think I need my water actually. In light of this, I will discuss two major deviations from Marshall's formulation. First, the coupling of rights from their national constellation. Second, the coupling of social cohesion from social inclusion or social justice. These deviations I will argue, have paradoxical implications, but they are crucial, fundamental, to our analysis of coherent conditions of citizenship. The first deviation I will mention briefly because this broken link between rights and nation-state membership it has already been iterated in the—in a number of studies, thus we are much more aware of it. I don't think we were—this was not the case when I first wrote about post-national citizenship, now almost fifteen years ago, but since then even the ASA has acquired two new sections, new I mean they are still in formation but nevertheless, one on human rights and the other one on global and transnational sociology. Okay, here's the observation though. The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a worldwide intensification of the discourse and instruments on the individual and her rights. Partly in response to the atrocities of fascism, and partly to massive decolonizations especially in Europe. The nation has lost its moral grip on citizenship. While human rights became the (inaudible) principle as codified in legal, scientific, and popular conventions. The Cold War facilitated the codification of human rights across the board. Even though they are often contested as legal and political practice, human rights now constitute a word level index of legitimate action and provide a hegemonic language for formulating claims to rights. The obstruction of rights beyond their national hold authorizes a diverse set of rights for a diverse set of populations rather than delineating a united citizenry with united set of rights, or unified set of rights I should say. I have tried to argue this in my own work, and I suggested that what we see is a change, or an emergence of a new model of citizenship, post-national, in which universal human rights replace national rights, and universal personhood replaces nationhood as the defining site of citizenship. I had explicated this forms, these new forms of citizenship in the case of Europe, for example in the membership of long term noncitizen immigrants, who hold various rights and privileges, without a formal nationality status In the increasing instances of dual citizenships for example which clearly breaches the traditional notions of political membership and loyalty to a single state. And also European Union citizenship, which represents a multilayered or multi

tiered form of membership. But the complex stuff may—post national citizenship lies in this. On the one hand, it implies multiplicity of membership status. Different categories of members are accorded with a set different set of rights, thus breeching the principle of uniform citizenship, and pretty much disarticulating the bundle of rights that so fundamentally underscore Marshall's notion of citizenship. On the other, post national transformation also means a broadened set of rights for a broadened group of people, for women children, gays and lesbians, religious and linguistic minorities, indigenous groups, immigrants. We embrace a new language for cultural, sexual, ecological, even global rights, legitimated by universalistic frameworks beyond the conventional list offered by Marshall. Most of our sociological debate focused so far on this first deviation, but understanding the extent and direction of changes in contemporary citizenship requires a closer attention to a second deviation from Marshall's original formulation, which I will now pick up. And I would like to formulate this deviation as the decoupling of social cohesion from social justice, or social citizenship if you want to use a more sociological term. As I've already stated in Marshall's trajectory, citizenship rights ensure equal participation in common, social, and political projects, which in turn facilitate solidarity and social cohesion. Indeed, as the European welfare state unfolded, solidarity and social cohesion rested upon the inclusion of the formerly excluded working classes and then women, in the social partnership and common project. And it was the connection between labor process, self worth, and the social security provided by the welfare state, which constituted the basis of mutual respect and solidarity in society, as reconciled in the ideals of social citizenship. The ongoing restructuring of the welfare state has weakened this connection between social citizenship and social cohesion. Social cohesion now predicates on the individual, an individual's moral responsibility to be productive, to realize self worth, and contribute to the society. Thus the shift in policy from social provision to social investment away from pro—a passive providing state, to active and responsible citizenry. The restructuring in Europe has been going on since the 1980s, but the architecture of this, the new European social project, it was sealed with the European Union's Lisbon Strategy, this was in 2000. The European welfare states now host a plethora of policy instruments to invest in individual's capacities, and boost their human and social capital, labor market activation, job insertion, and apprenticeship schemes, skill training, and skill improvement programs, early childhood and lifelong learning, these are all toward enhanced self realization among others. Many commentators attribute this shift in orientation to the penetration of free market ideologies into European policy circles. I'm not convinced that this is the only story. Although a rather aggressive neo-liberal economic turn has chipped away at the foundations of the European welfare state, we don't really see a roll back of the welfare state in favor of unregulated markets. Rather we see a shift in its financial and moral investments. As such, I would like to suggest that the new social project reflects a fundamental change in the constituent elements of what it means to be

a good citizen, and what it means with society and its moral language of justice. And this is where we link to the first deviation that I elaborated. In the new framework, individuals are not only the bearer of rights on the basis of personhood, but as Nancy Frasier puts it; they also constitute the basic unit of moral concern, whose autonomy deserves respect. So the bounds of justice no longer coincide with national citizenship and society, the locus has moved to the individual. And this is I think a much longer trend, and a deeper challenge, to those of us who care about citizenship, to which I hope that our discussion will come back. Indeed when we look at the new European social project, it's actually a continuum of a series of policy reforms that underscores the active and participatory citizen. And I would like to give examples from two other policy fields. In education, for example, this is since the 1990s there has a strong push to raise standards in math, language, and science subjects as part of strategies to boost human capital, but there's another aspect to education very strongly again in European educational circles and education systems: a strong emphasis on the teaching of active citizenship. Civic teachings for example, one where they get civics teaching in schools, it now projects a cosmopolitan individual, cosmopolitan individuals globally aware and adaptive, with emphasis on developing capabilities as effective, engaged, and responsible young persons, ready to contribute at all levels; at local, national, European in this case of course, and global levels. But human rights, international solidarity, environmental responsibilities, these are big themes in education. And it's well to remember that the architects of this new educational focus are not necessarily the proponents of new liberal ideologies. In immigration policy fields, again since the late 1990s, selective migration and integration have become the main priorities. These two, actually more or less underlined main logic of immigration policies in Europe now: selective migration and integration. And in the last two decades, again most European countries set further limitations on unskilled labor migration; this includes family reunification, while facilitating the mobility of skilled labor and the talented within and without the European Union. And several countries also introduced legislation making integration a prerequisite for long term residency, and also for naturalization. So compulsory citizenship tests, which we always thought that they were very much a US thing, they are now introduced as route to naturalization, they are compulsory in many countries. These policy moves prompted some observers to comment on the return of the nation centered citizenship projects in Europe. But a systematic review of the content of these tests, citizenship tests, finds that they do not reveal anything distinctive about the particularities of the nation, bar the questions about ordinary symbols such as flag or the national anthem, or a distinct philosophy of integration. The largest schematic theme when you look at these tests is that they address the notions of individual rights and democracy. Knowledge of democratic institutions and legal structure occupies a prominent place in anticipation of a right bearing individual, fluent in a world of tax offices, schools, courts, and labor markets. Thus, integration as conveyed in these

citizenship tests and citizenship projects is not a nation or state centered project. In its place integration acquires the purpose of achieving social cohesion driven by active, participatory, and productive individuals through individual immigrants' own effort and responsibility to take part productively in the rights and institutions offered in the system. What underlies all these European policy reforms in different policy fields and thus the deviation from Marshall's notion of citizenship, is the trust put into the value of individuality, and its transformative capacity. Sanctified as a collective good, individuality on the one hand elicits the recognition of universal qualities as opposed to ascriptive ones such as race, gender, and class, and enhancement of universal freedoms of rights. And this is what made possible the expansion of the boundaries of citizenship in post war Europe, as exemplified—different post national that I've exemplified in my work. On the other—the same tenant also nourishes the idea of individuality as a form of capital. Realizing self potential becomes a right and responsibility, and forms expectations about the self and others. Individuals are all expected to invest in themselves and their abilities. Being productive, creative, and active defines a higher form of life. Immigrants, along with other vulnerable sections of the society, ethnic minorities, youth, and women, they are disadvantaged by this push. As outsiders, they have the added burden of proving the potential and worth of their individuality, and this route from outsider to insider is not an easy one. As we know, sociological research affirms one after another that social inheritance is still the main determinate of life chances. Even in the Scandinavian welfare states apparently, have not managed to eradicate all, the effects of all the—social inheritance, this is Gosta Esping-Andersen's recent work. It is this uneasy tension between the transformative capacities of individuality and realization of social justice that underlines exclusions in contemporary Europe. And this is what takes us back to Marshall's dilemma. In the new European citizenship project, the moral and legal boundaries—boundaries of who can participate, who are entitled, these are extended through universalistic human rights. But the social and institutional impediments to effective participation via market processes, communicative contractions, or family and professional contexts, are not sufficiently addressed, and Nancy Frasier I think very aptly calls these "misty cognitions." The project fails to address the factors that entrenched differential capacities, the very obstacles to the parity of individuality. These emerging fault lines no longer simply cut through without, but also within Europe, so it's not only the non European immigrant or migrant that's left out, but also the lesser Europeans: those who are unable to exercise and live up to the high—higher form of life, of being productive, those who are stuck in secondary and temporary jobs, or those who are not able to climb the social ladder, those who face ethnic and religious discrimination in their schooling, in their skill training programs, and in job applications. And so far the new European project has not promised a satisfactory delivery to the these fault lines that underline the current conditions of citizenship.

But then, where does this leave us sociologists? I think very, very briefly I will address this as a last thread of thought to invite your comments and discussion. In the newly shaping sociology of rights, the relationship between human rights and citizenship rights in contentious. I mean this came out very clearly in Peggy's presentation. But in response to the retraction of rights, particularly this is the post 9/11 era, many scholars question the potential of globally sanctioned human rights for justice, prompting calls for renewing national citizenship, analytical and enormative promise, as granter of individual rights. I'm saying—about this call. First, analytically I think I—this would be a nonstarter. We no longer live in a world where nation states and their purview can be analyzed autonomously, doing so would be turning the wheel back and ignore the analytical lesson that we learned from the amassed body of research in the last thirty years from the likes of Ward Society Institutionalists, or globalization scholars such as Saskia Sassen, among many others. As their research shows, the global and national are intertwined, not only through the interdependence of markets, or global institutions of human rights, but these global elements actually are in what we conventially define as national. They're not something out there, and they rearticulate the national with the global. Only by taking such an analytical approach, we are able to discern patterns of exclusions and inclusions that are driven by the world wide spread of economic and political liberalisms. Second, if we are concerned with the progress of rights and social justice, again the sociology of rights does not have a choice but to hold onto human rights. Citizenship in European history, I mean this is European history for sure, we know the exemption of the US in these kind of arguments, but it's had its more progressive transformations through the transnational normativity of human rights. The expansion of the rights of citizens in Europe, both in terms of their substantive content, and their coverage, has been tightly connected to the institutionalization of global human rights in the second part of the twentieth century. So the alternative cannot be, and should not be, between human rights and national citizenship, and in that I join others. I think, I do... Seyla Benhabib, Peggy Summers, that sociology of rights can only be about the universals of human recognition and inclusion, and their institutional and social foundations, no matter where they are located. That would be I think only right to T.H. Marshall's legacy. So I welcome the foundation of the two new sections of the ASA, we still have to discuss. I will stop there.

MATT DESMOND:    Thank you Professor Soysal. Questions please, comments. There's microphones on either side of the room. Right here. If you can speak up just so everyone'll hear.

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  What an interesting discussion, I enjoyed all of your presentations very, very much. And I wanted to raise one question about the relative balance between citizenship conceptions and human rights conceptions as a basis for social inclusion. And I wonder whether the viability of one basis or the other is kind of a

primary foundation for defending social inclusion in our commercially in a sense, may not defend—depend a bit more than has been emphasized here in these great presentations on nationally distinctive traditions and political histories. I mean it strikes me the relative balance between a more citizenship based or human rights approach to defending social inclusion, may really be quite different in different countries as a function of political histories, so I wonder if you can say a little bit about the role of political histories in creating a viability for one or another approach to social inclusion.

PROFESSOR MARTIN BULMER:  Well, only to say what I said—

MATT DESMOND:   Could you repeat the question, nobody heard it in the audience.

MARGARET PEGGY SUMMERS:    You need to repeat the question.

MATT DESMOND:  How could I do justice to a complicated question like that? A question about intellectual history, and national history and what that has to do with social rights, is that, does that do it justice?

AUDIENCE MEMBER:   That will be good enough. In the interest of time.

PROFESSOR MARTIN BULMER:  I would just emphasize what I said earlier, that if you read Marshall's book it is very British centered and it's purely focus on the British historical experience. The interesting thing is that it has become generalized, but it, it doesn't purport to do that and as far as I can see doesn't make very much reference at all to other countries.

MARGARET PEGGY SUMMERS:  Well in order to, to try to hypothesize what, how different political traditions have affected that proportional question of the balance between human and citizenship rights, one would have to first come to an agreement over a country's particular political tradition. And with respect to the United States, people are still arguing over whether it's a Lockean or a republican, small r, heritage. Or some mix thereof of the two. If you read the Declaration of Independence it's clearly a Lockean natural rights argument about—it's self evident, is the critical term. If you look at the French declaration of the rights of citizens and or—What is it? The rights of man-them, and citizens, it's a complete muddle of natural rights and citizenship rights that are based on sovereignty, that are based on inherent French-ness, that are simply natural, naturally given. So that's a sort of weasily way out of your question I guess. But it is true that what I believe Marshall, in the end, to the extent that there's any credibility in my argument that he's giving us a theory of human rights, turning the thing upside down and taking a more—a deeper form of an Arednt-ian argument. He's essentially blurring, and I think this is what Yasemine is saying, blurring this really false dichotomy. Because what he's doing is he's saying we no longer can distinguish between human

rights and citizenship rights on the basis of one being based on autonomy, and the other being based on membership. He's saying they're both based on membership, they both require a priori membership recognition in order to have any kinds of rights at all. They are both essentially—So it's not a—it's not saying that human rights should be rejected at all, he's saying that the causal hypo—the theory of the self evidence of human rights has to be called into question and instead treated like any other sociological and contentious operation.

YASEMINE SOYSAL:  I think we would do such a great injustice to a whole mass body of comparative historical sociological research, clearly, if we don't think that nationally distinctive historical institutions make a difference in—for the issues that we are discussing here in terms of the relative balance of human rights versus more nation based citizenship. But—very, very briefly and this is similar to what Peggy is saying, is that, here is the issue: Citizenship rights expanded when human rights expanded, their trajectory is very much entangled. And that is the main issue that we now, maybe not looking at the historical origins as much, can put on the agenda and discuss. And they are now being detracted but they are both detracted. I mean, when you, when you are challenging human rights you are actually challenging citizens rights now, and that's the important point I think.

MATT DESMOND:    Please go ahead with your question.

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Oh, yes I jumped ahead, somebody left. This question is really about if you, in institutionalizing social rights, expansive social rights, immediately raises the question of what policy tools and designs you will use to do that. And as we know, policy designs have profound unintended consequences often. They also, as we know from a lot of political science literature lately, have policy feedbacks on the civic capacity of the people who are affected one way or the other. So that for instance in an area like rights of elderly for social security, Medicare, etc, Andrea Louise Campbell has a wonderful book that shows in fact these programs were designed to create—and created a solidarity across class among elderly people to protect those rights over decades. Big problem though arises in, even in the best of situations, which is many of the policy tools create the sense of n entitlement to a right that never has to be questioned in terms of is there any trade off? Are there any losses? Do we have to deliberate with others in the community? And as Campbell in fact concludes her book, after this glorious analysis of what we've done around elder rights, is there's no possibility, the way these have institutionalized, for having a proper debate about investment in money—in children as an investment as opposed to consumption of, by elderly. In other words our policy system has become so distorted, so that you have things like last year's Tea Party arguments where somebody says "Keep the government's hands off my, off my Medicare," well that's not just a distortion of a crazed Tea Party person, that's part of the policy design that enables people with certain kind

of rights to say "These are expansive, I don't have to question whether there's a carrying capacity in terms of the public's willingness and ability to pay for these things, or whether there are any tradeoffs." So I just want, in thinking about the institutionalization of social rights, do we need any other kinds of concepts to, you know to think about in effect, what their limits are, I guess. How do we bound them? How you know, Yasemine's term she mentioned what is the responsibility for citizens who have these rights that then index all of the other things that might not be getting, or might be getting done too much of if you will. Just a question.

MARGARET PEGGY SUMMERS: Well I can't, can't help myself here. I reject the entire proposition that, that—which is an economist's set of presuppositions that you're making, namely that these are trade-offs. That something that's going to the elderly is taken away from the young, and that, that these are finite resources. The concept that I believe is necessary is the shift from rights to public goods, and recognizing that societies, in order to function, have to have public goods in order to make up for what the market cannot, cannot provide. And we see what happens when health care is not a public good. It does very little good to run around "I have a right to healthcare," when you don't have a right to healthcare. But it—but it is a very empirically provable statement that universal access to healthcare makes for, say, a better society in multiple, multiple ways. If you look at the book "The Spirit Level," which I highly recommend, Richard Wilkinson and I forget the co-author, show on multiple dimensions how much internal inequality has, including to health care, has essentially lowered the economic and social well being of the United States. And it's—they're really stunning, stunning findings. SO we shift it, we get out of this deficit hysteria, there-- you know that's a complete invention, it's a product of starving the beast, you have to read my book to understand starving the beast, and it's all designed as a way to essentially destroy the social state and to use the kinds of language of trade-offs that, I don't mean to pick on you as an individual, but the language, that discourse that treats it in those terms.

MATT DESMOND: I think we can time for one more question if that's okay. Please.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes. The panel began with talking about the legacy of the Civil War, and a part of that was the fourteenth amendment which extended—which in part extended citizenship to freed blacks and subsequently has been used to extend citizenship or define to grant automatic citizenship to anyone born in the United States. While this is very complex and not that simplistic, nonetheless the United States generally does grant citizenship to people born in United States easier than say people born in most European countries. How would Marshall's work inform this notion of citizenship as a right of birth, regardless of the status of the parents?

PROFESSOR MARTIN BULMER:  I'm not sure that it would. I'm thinking about post war migration to Britain, I mean Marshall was not speaking in, in a context where there was significant large scale migration. That's partly what I was saying about, I was looking for his references in his work to anything about the United States, as far as I can see there was nothing. And the American experience is so different in that respect from the experience in many European countries. I think Yasemine would agree with me that significant migration has mostly been post, post war. Where these issue have arisen, but social citizenship doesn't seem to me to be tied to a notion of what entitlement a person has by reason of where they're born. Indeed that, that's very much not the burden of a lot of your work, is about what are the rights of various migrant groups within European countries who are necessarily born in those, born in those countries. And how those have changed over time, I was thinking for example of the Turkish minority in Germany, a very large minority who only, I think in the third generation are starting to acquire certain citizenship rights, the other two were being withheld from them.

MATT DESMOND:  Well that will be our last word.  Please join me in thanking these wonderful panelists.