

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: THE PLACE OF FORCE IN HUMAN SOCIETY *

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HUMAN beings learn early that almost everything they want can be obtained only through each other's cooperation, whether their need or goal is a mother's breast or a love potion, a slave uprising or a new colony, a Nobel Prize or protection against a bullying policeman. Everyone learns, consciously or not, accurately or not, various ways of controlling others for one's own ends. Few people spend much time calculating how to control others, but everyone does so part of the time.

Whatever people do, for whatever goals, will be evaluated by others, who will become thereby more or less willing to cooperate, more or less likely to resist, more or less likely to continue in the relationship. We all interact with others, engage in a flow of transactions with others; and whatever we do has some effect on others, to our advantage or not, in conformity with our wishes or not, and whether or not we will it so.

Consequently, however else we might classify the wide range of human acts, we can also view them as samples of social control processes, i.e., the ways by which people shape the flow of each other's behavior. Almost all can be grouped into a small number of types of social control

forces. One of these is force and force-threat, which I shall henceforth simply call "force"; when I mean only "overt force," I shall so label it.¹

The use of force—and I repeat, I mean by this term both force-threat and overt force—is as ubiquitous as the preachments against it. Whatever else social systems are, they are also force systems. Force constitutes one of the major foundations of all social structures. The processes by which the command of force is expended, exchanged, accumulated, or lost, are universal in social interaction, because force is one of the fundamental resources people and groups need to elicit cooperation, help, and conformity from one another.

Force constitutes one of the four great social control systems in all societies. For two millennia, social analysts have given much attention to three of these—which they have variously termed force, prestige, and wealth—because these underlie all stratification systems.² The fourth, which

¹ For related definitions, see Bierstedt (1950), Etzioni (1961), French and Ravin (1959), Parsons (1967), Dahl (1957), Cartwright (1959), Lasswell and Kaplan (1950), and Russell (1938).

² Plato, it will be remembered, distinguished among these three reward systems. Gold people, for example, were not to have wealth, but high prestige; the silver people were to apply force; but the brass and iron people were permitted material wealth. Hobbes' definitions of the bases of power also include these and others (1935:54-62). Cf. also Sumner's (1959:33-34) "hunger, love, vanity, and fear"; and the more widely used Weberian categories of class, status, and party.

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may be called love, friendship, or personal attraction, has less often appeared in grand theory, more often being viewed as an accidental or intrusive set of forces; and no one has ascertained whether its impact is as systematic as the other three.³

Every person and group participates in these control systems, gaining or losing in one or more, investing wisely or foolishly, with few or great results. Over time, some accumulate far more resources, and are better able to obtain whatever pleasures and comforts, dignities and treasures, may be available. Both individuals and groups, families, and corporations, social strata and nations, may enjoy this fate; although of course most do not.⁴

It is necessary to separate each of these four systems from the other. Force, prestige, wealth and love should not be confused under the slippery term, "power," because they differ both concretely and theoretically. That they differ concretely is proved by our own acts in the course of the day: in order to persuade others to do something, we may here decide to threaten a lawsuit, and there praise another for a fine performance; or in still another situation simply offer money. Theoretical analysis will reveal many parallel patterns partly because at the psychological level these factors are experienced as rewards and punishments. A full exposition of their differences would take us far afield, but let me note such theoretically important differences as the following:

1. It is possible to expand almost indefinitely

³ Both Plato and Hobbes took note of this set of forces, as have many others, but none has analyzed it systematically. My colleague Allan A. Silver has for some years been engaged in such a study.

⁴ Talcott Parsons has eloquently put forward the view, in *The Structure of Social Action* and again in briefer form in *The Social System*, that we may conceive of the broad area of human behavior as being shaped by, or analyzable through, the biological, personality, social, and cultural systems. Within the social, we can distinguish several analytically distinct, qualitatively different levels of analysis: political science, dealing with power relations; economics, dealing with the problems of allocating scarce resources to alternative ends; and sociology, dealing with social integration and normative consensus, the integration of social and cultural goals. All three may be viewed as action systems.

the number of one's economic customers, as well as the number of people one rules by force; but one cannot do so for friendship and love.

2. One can make explicit contracts in economic exchanges, enforceable by law, and explicit contracts or exchanges to gain a command of force, often not enforceable by law; but one cannot by contract obtain another's love or friendship, respect or esteem.
3. One can retire from production for the economic market, but one's actions continue to be evaluated by prestige criteria as long as one lives.
4. A social organization that relies on overt force (e.g., a slave system, a prison) differs substantially from one that relies on affection or esteem, with reference to such characteristics as its members', normative commitment to collective goals, their belief that the system is just, their willingness to leave the organization, how well they work if not supervised, and so on.
5. Overt force can expropriate whatever wealth is available, but it cannot extort love; for we cannot love another or cause another to love us by willing it.
6. Overt force can command the external trappings of honor and deference, encomiastic speeches, and the kowtows and obeisances of even unwilling subjects; but it cannot by fiat elicit respect in those subjects' minds.

Although these differences are not here presented systemically, and their implications are not all self-evident, they suggest that it might be theoretically profitable to examine each of these four realms or processes separately. They may well be viewed as distinct elementary processes (Homans, 1961:3-7), which in interaction shape much of our social behavior, but whose patterns and characteristics are best understood if we see them as analytically separable. They may be viewed, in fact, as crude parallels to different types of physical forces whose analysis yields relationships that parallel one another in some ways, forces that cannot yet, even in that most advanced of fields, be analyzed by an integrated field theory.

The systematic study of force as a distinct phenomenon or set of processes has been singularly neglected in the history of social thought, partly because its use has been viewed as deplorable, and therefore occurring mainly in unusual, deviant, criminal, or evil circumstances.

Philosophers and rulers have joined in

deploring force, the former because they correctly perceived that its use implies an unjust demand, the latter because they were convinced that their just reign required no force. After all, subjects, happy with their government, obey because they want to do so. Doubtless, rulers have also guessed that subjects who are persuaded violence is wrong are easier to command.

Against the view that political or social systems do not rest on force except in deviant circumstances is a recurring theme, largely expressed (though not often publicly) by dissidents, women, slaves, children, and the lower orders generally, that force is the foundation of rule. This may seem to be a self-serving view, since they are precisely the most likely victims of force and force-threat. Nevertheless, since neither of these opposing views has been investigated systematically, we should now examine both.

We sociologists have neglected such an examination because we share a long humanistic tradition whose biases deny the ultimate importance of force. We have been taught to believe in man's unconquerable soul, his often mute but always staunch resistance to tyranny. We can observe over the panorama of the past five hundred years in Western nations, and more recently in others, the slow advance of human rights and freedom against monarchy and imperialism, dictatorship and despotism, propaganda and news control. Consequently, we continue to feel, whatever the evidence before our eyes, that somehow human beings do resist force and force threat over time, and that man's will to freedom not only endures, but prevails.

In addition, as sociologists and culturologists, we harbor the bias that force will have little effect on a cultural or social system, that organic life somehow resists or survives the rude threats of a mortar gun, or the blazing pain of napalm. After all, the Chinese swallowed their Mongol and Manchu rulers, the Indonesians pushed out the Dutch, the Indians did not become English, and so on.

However, that sanguine view of history should not be allowed to obscure other facts. For example, Rome did impose its cultural patterns on a wide area; indeed we are all

moulded to some degree by Roman conquests. The Islamic conquest not only shaped the Arab world, but its heritage spread far beyond to Spain and Portugal in the West, and Indonesia in the East. The Iberian conquerors of the New World imposed their culture and social system on that area, undermining or destroying most of the native cultures encountered along the way (Goode, 1961). Both they and the Anglo invaders of the New World imposed their culture and social system on the slaves they imported from Africa.

But leaving aside such grand examples of cultural clash, that sanguine view overlooks the cruel fact that a human being lives but a short time, while such conquests and tyrannies may last for centuries. To say that they are ineffective because they will ultimately fail to impose their social and cultural systems, ignores the truth that temporarily they do so; and "temporarily" may well outlast the life of an individual.

Sociologists have always agreed that all societies must be able to command enough force to kill or restrain those who cannot be controlled by other means. For anyone can at least be stopped by overt force from doing something (Parsons, 1967:265-71). However, sociologists have mainly focused, for the past half-century, on the other means of control. They have explored mainly the impact of the normative order, explaining social action by reference to values and value consensus. They have shown that people obey the rules of the society, group, or family because they have been socialized to believe the rules are right. For example, it is not merely unprofitable to defraud, steal, or kill; it is morally repugnant.

Sociologists have urged, correctly I think, that if people and groups act only with a rational view to their personal profit and with no inner normative controls, then group structures, goals, and controls would be unsupported and a war of all against all would result (Parsons, 1937:89-102).

On the other hand, as I and others have noted, this essentially Lintonian view is partly incorrect, since the observable consensus and normative commitment are not total enough to create the necessary social controls (Goode, 1960a, 1960b). Some opinion is set against almost any normative

rule; people alter their faith when they change social positions; beliefs vary among social strata; and so on. Such observations suggest, at a minimum, that if social control systems are to succeed, they require far more support than internal moral commitment can yield. That support may come from gains and losses in wealth, or from affection or force, but surely not alone from normative commitment.

With that bias toward moral commitment as an explanation, sociologists have felt, along with most social analysts, that force was a weak reed to lean on, and that no regime or society can rest on force alone. Indeed it cannot; but neither must it do so. None ever need try; rulers and conquerors, like teachers and husbands, army officers and employers, always command other resources. We have rejected an empty claim. On the other hand, no sensible person would argue that any society, organization, or group has tried to operate without that most potent weapon.

If this is properly the territory of our sister discipline, political science, they have not bothered to cultivate it; and we shall not be usurpers. Indeed, force has been analyzed mainly as overt force, in criminal violence or the repression of criminal violence, or in war and war games of various kinds.

Much more important, force processes may be so general that we can view their analysis as a distinct task, like that of market processes in economics. That is, they are to be observed or guessed at in all social systems and pervade all continuing social relations to some degree. Thus, no existing intellectual field can claim any better right to study them than any other.

We shall understand these phenomena more clearly if we stop thinking of them as occurring only in despotisms and tyrannies, among criminals, or in war, and instead begin to observe that in any civil society, as e.g., England and Scandinavia, everyone is subject to force. All are engaged in it daily, not alone as victims but as perpetrators as well. Everyone controls some force, and offers some force-threat to others. We are all potentially dangerous to one another. Once we see that, and the pervasiveness of such dynamics in our social life, we

shall be better able to observe their regularities and to measure their effects.

In this view, and by this definition, force is very human, not simply an animal heritage to be eventually overcome. Indeed, force exhibits a very different structure in other animal societies, even among predators, whose killing propensities seem so like our own. The differences can be briefly summarized:⁵

1. Within such societies, animals will not fight to the death, and will not kill when they have vanquished another.
2. The leader or dominant animal does not give orders to subordinates to use force on recalcitrant members.
3. Members do not organize to support or to kill leaders.
4. Weaker animals cannot kill dominant animals.

Given these structural differences, it seems plausible to view human force systems as worthy of study in their own right, not as a leftover from our animal past, or processes that occur when a social system or subsystem has broken down into a jungle chaos.

Concepts and Measurement. Not all the conceptual and methodological problems of this challenging proposal can be adequately discussed here; and some central ones cannot, I believe, be solved in this decade. To touch on a few will, however, clarify the theoretical orientation I urge.

As a first step in conceptual clarification, I suggest eliminating the term "power" from sociological analyses for the next decade. We have too long avoided dealing seriously with force by shoving it under that grand label. The term is both too broad and too narrow, even in its most popular, Weberian definition: i.e., one has power to the degree that one can impose his will even against re-

⁵ The first statement is drawn from ethological reports (Lorenz, 1963; Mowat, 1963; Ardrey, 1966). The second and third are essentially deductions from sociological theory. Of course, animal groups will sometimes kill "strangers," and when caged may become very homicidal. Under some conditions, it is believed, rats will wage "war" in the same building. Elephants are reported to drive out rogue elephants collectively. However, the only animals that typically violate the first rule are special stocks, created by man for killing: fighting bulls, game cocks, pit bulldogs.

sistance. It is too narrow, because even if one *can* impose one's will, the other person or group commands power too. As Machiavelli wisely remarked over four centuries ago, even a victory is not absolute (Machiavelli, 1935:180).

It is too broad because one can impose one's will through all sorts of resources, from bribery or love to the thrust of an army corps. A child may impose its will by a smile, or a respected colleague by a lifted eyebrow.

Still more important, because this allusive, adumbrative label conveys a penumbra of domination by bayonets and coercion, we feel we have dealt with force and force-threat without examining the processes by which, for example, money can purchase a force-threat, or civil societies or economic or family systems may at various points be supported by force.

For similar reasons, we should no longer use the terms "forced compliance" or "coercion" to mean overt or physical force. We feel coerced or forced to comply when we do not wish to do something but feel the other person can make our resistance too costly to bear. Such a lopsided bargaining situation can occur when we are frightened by the anger of our beloved or the possible contempt of our friend, and not alone when we face a hoodlum's knife or a despot's gun.

On the other hand, we may not feel coerced even when we do confront overt force, simply because we believe we can overcome it, or because we are willing to pay that price. Thus, it is not overt force that defines a situation of coercion, but our desire not to obey the command, and our perception that the cost of resistance is too high, whether in physical punishment, the loss of esteem, money, or affection.

Next, we should note that force is empirically and definitionally not limited to punishment or deterrence. We can reward another by backing that person in a conflict with whatever forces we command. Force protects each individual, as e.g., various of our civil rights are, or can be, backed by a court order enforceable by a marshal; or as a wife can be protected by force against the threats of her husband. Force can persuade others to *do* something, not merely to stop doing something. Physical force and its threat can alter another's cost reward

calculations, and thus move him or her toward the action we desire.

All this is true for other resources as well. Love or affection can turn into hate. A salary can be reduced or raised, and profit turned into loss. One can be hired or fired. We can be esteemed for our action, or denigrated. We can experience force, then, as punishment or reward, as we do other important resources that shape our behavior. It is a philosophical bias, not empirical observation, that views force as only punishment and deterrence.

The problem of observation in this realm is acute, because the influence of force is shown precisely by the difficulty of observing it in ordinary civil life. It is not visible because it has been effective. Indeed, a fruitful working hypothesis about social and biological life is that some forces are not less powerful for being less visible, not unimportant because they are called into play less often; some phenomena are striking for their absence. With reference to such factors, we can guess that if they are rare, or rarely visible, it is because other complex and efficacious processes reduce their frequency of appearance, or change them into less threatening forms. We live in a sea of deadly germs, yet remain healthy; our heart rarely fails to adjust to extreme variations in demand for blood flow; killer animals almost never kill members of their own species when they fight. In these and similar cases, it is profitable to ask why an apparently likely outcome does not occur frequently.

In social life, all of us have felt murderous rages, but few of us have murdered (Goode 1969). I have previously argued that love is kept under control, is prevented from appearing as often or as devastatingly as it might by a wide range of social patterns (Goode, 1959). We might be fooled into supposing that the imperious drive of sex is weak, since no society we know was a hotbed of fleshly pleasure; but we know, from our own lives, that numerous controls bar the creation of so happy a state.

Following this working guess, I assert that the importance of force and force-threat in human behavior is richly demonstrated by the rarity of its use. Living as we do in protected environments, we rarely

see anyone manhandled, or hear an overt threat—except from fellow drivers. Nevertheless, every social system is a force system. The two statements do not make a paradox, because every social system contains mechanisms, processes, and patterns whose result and often intention is to prevent the outbreak of overt force. Even in systems with a high overt force component, such as a prison, such outbreaks are infrequent (Sykes, 1958; Cressey, 1966; Glaser, 1967).

Thus a U.S. businessman does not ship arms to a belligerent country because he knows they will be confiscated. Nor does a divorced husband remove his children from the custody of his wife. He knows that she could haul him into court. Indeed, the use of physical force betokens a failure of the force-control processes.

Partly for that reason, we cannot solve our methodological problem by gathering a sample of violent episodes on a frontier. The problem is not merely that cases of overt physical force are relatively rare. It is rather that short of actual killing or jailing, *most cases of even overt force* are instances of force-threat, promises of more to come. In few robberies is the victim physically subdued. Instead, he is threatened. If a bullying policeman shoves a citizen, the latter correctly perceives the action less as force than as a threat of more force, a possible escalation to death. In a country with a settled electoral and judicial tradition, a vote count almost always signals that the loser must step down, under a threat of overt force rarely expressed; and a court order to vacate the office is a command backed by overt force. So well is this understood that in the United States, rife at times with corruption and often violent in its reactions, no defeated major office-holder, with whatever police forces at his or her command, has ever denied his or her office to the winner of an election.

The cases of the business man who obeys government regulations, the husband who accepts a custody arrangement, or the defeated office-holder who vacates his or her office, sharpen the observational problem, while showing how overt force shades into force-threat, and most often is felt as a threat of more force. In instances of force *not* im-

mediate and physical, the individual may be unaware that he or she has been moved by such a threat and in fact not even calculate how far he or she could resist without overt force being applied. Much force appears to people not as a threat of violence, but simply the rules of the game, the obvious reality of the cosmos, to which one must bow unthinkingly.⁶

Moreover, where the use of overt force is almost certain, those who conform may do so for other reasons. For example, we do not walk into an office of General Motors and begin using an idle calculating machine because we believe it is morally wrong, or even because we would be quickly ejected, but more immediately and consciously because our friends would consider us foolish or bizarre.⁷ Or, again, we may refuse to race on the highway, saying we could be carted off to a village jail, when in fact we are much more fearful of a wreck.

The methodological problem is, in short, how to measure the variance accounted for by force and force-threat, in an action or set of actions in which the participant may not have an accurate idea of its impact, and may not have considered force a possibility; or, if aware, may be unwilling to confess it.

But though I do not yet see how such problems of observation and measurement can be solved at present, our theoretical explorations should not await their resolution. Rather, they are more likely to be worked out if we can offer interesting or fruitful propositions that can be tested only when those problems have been solved.

I suggest, therefore, that inquiry into the control processes of force might be worthwhile. It follows from this orientation that all highly industrialized societies are high force systems, by comparison with almost all societies that have gone before them. No dissident groups of substantial size can hide out and engage in armed resistance,

⁶ Holmes' classic comment is relevant to these cases: Law is "... a statement of the circumstances in which the public force will be brought to bear upon men through the courts." (Howe, 1961: vol 2:212).

⁷ I.e., we conform because of the threat of prestige-loss. The case should, however, suggest to the more daring readers a rich field for natural field experimentation.

set up a competing regime, or impose a radically different system on these nations. There are no earls or dukes whose armed and loyal retainers might be a threat to the social or political system.

More significant, their citizens support the social and political systems, and would back them with force were they attacked by dissident groups. This is as true of Holland and Sweden, with their low homicide and crime rates and low frequency of army attacks against civilians, as it is of the United States, with its somewhat higher rates.

By contrast, some Latin American countries, like Bolivia and Colombia, whose governments over the past decade have had to muster soldiers to protect themselves against rebels or competing subgovernments, would be placed much lower on this scale. Some African countries with a high use of overt governmental force, and some countries in the east of India would fall still lower on such a scale. Most bloody despotisms of the past would rank only modestly high on this scale, supported as they were by only a palace guard and their own soldiers. A neat demonstration of the low position of some Latin American countries is the fact that only rarely have the masses risen in armed support of an overthrown regime.⁸

In general, the widespread use of physical force by the regime or dominant groups in a society is probably negatively correlated with that country's position on the scale of the force it commands, because the application of overt force tells us that many people in the society oppose the political or social system, and are unwilling to back it by force, i.e., by informal controls over dissidents.

However, the negative correlation may be a modest one because (1) dominant groups are not necessarily wise, and may use more or less than the optimum amount of physical force for the control they seek, just as parents may use more or less force on their children than would be most effective or rational. Perhaps, for historical reasons, rulers of contemporary Russia use more overt force than necessary; (2)

leaders may command much physical force and force-threat, yet use their overt force to increase still more control; and (3) rulers may, knowing their support or force resources are modest, wisely accept the situation, and refuse to risk their positions by embarking on a course of armed repression. Despite these qualifications, the general negative correlation between a regime's command of force and use of physical force seems evident.

Since this view insists that everyone commands some force, if only because others may protect him or her, and everyone is potentially a threat or a support, we need ask not only how much force the regime or the dominant strata enjoys, but how much counterforce the citizenry can muster. We may imagine a low force regime with a high force citizenry (although I believe this unlikely), or a high force regime with a high-force citizenry. Let us consider the latter.

Although there is some truth in Casanova's comment (which he attributed to a Jesuit) that no nation suffers heavy taxation where its citizenry is armed, and in Machiavelli's comment that a wise man who becomes ruler of a city will arm its citizens to gain their support in exchange for the trust and respect he has thus given, there is little truth in the parallel insight that an armed citizenry is free, or will not tolerate despots.

Harsh and even terrorist rulers have abounded in West and East African kingdoms (Walter, 1969) where almost every adult male was a warrior. The Germans were both free and armed when they clashed with Rome, if Tacitus reported correctly; but the Asiatic steppes and the Islamic countries from the Punjab westerly to Africa have been both armed and victims of autocrats for a thousand years of recorded history. Switzerland and Iceland were both armed and free; but during much of Latin America's chaotic political and social life, its populace has been armed and unfree.

All this follows from our theoretical conception; for a society's total force is not a summation of the individual capacity to kill, but a function of the social organization of force. Consequently, armed but unorganized citizens may be, and indeed

⁸ Walter Goldfrank reminds me of at least one case, that of Benito Juarez in Mexico.

usually are, helpless before the organized might of a tyrant's army and police, even when these are few in number.

The force of a free citizenry is not, then, determined by how many guns they possess, but by their collective determination to resist. This in turn is primarily a function of their faith that their fellow human beings will not let them stand alone against the physical force of a ruler, but will rather risk individual injury to prevent collective injury. Thus, in ranking a citizenry by the force it commands, the question is not so much whether it owns more guns than the government, but whether its members can count on each other for support against encroachments on their freedom. That is the measure of its force. With that capacity, guns can be obtained; without it, guns have historically been of little use.

Thus, we can argue that political and social systems like the Scandinavian and Anglo countries, Iceland, Switzerland, or Holland do command high force since they would be militarily supported by their citizenry against any physical force that sought to impose radical changes against their will, and because technically they command a vast quantity of military and police equipment. But they are also systems in which the citizens themselves command high force, although in most the homicide and crime rates, and the amount of violence used by citizens and the government is low.

The citizens of such countries can and do reject leaders, in the strict sense that they can and do vote them out; and their verdict is backed by force. Again, the verdict is not settled by armed conflict, because those concerned are certain of the outcome.

Our own country falls into this category too, but since some will reject this description, let me be more specific. In face of the cynicism or despair about the trend of our time, feelings which I often share, I assert that: (1) certainly in this country we have suffered encroachments on our liberties over the past three years; (2) but, over a longer span, perhaps a generation or more, our freedoms have been strengthened; (3) whether we look at the past few years or the past generation, the world as a whole has witnessed an expansion of civil freedoms and rights unparalleled throughout history;

(4) in any event, as my analysis shows, freedom is never absolute, to be acquired once and for all. Precisely because it is a relationship, based on collective trust and buttressed by one's fellow citizens' willingness to back it with force, it varies over time, forever being lost or regenerated. What we have lost in the U.S. in the past three years, we shall regain.

The foregoing analysis contains several concrete and theoretical hypotheses, and leads to a technical formulation, which I shall briefly expound. First, Americans will in fact resist with overt force large encroachments on their freedom; and this fact will weigh heavily in the calculations of those who might wish to embark on a program of repression.

Second, whether a businessman, a potential criminal, a pupil, a colony, will risk death, jail, or other forms of physical violence—in short, will violate a rule, or refuse to accept social control—is not a function alone of the firepower or physical strength of such controls and of the visibility of the dereliction, but of whether in either side's evaluations the cost of submission outweighs the threat of force. In short, how much are the alternative actions worth as goals? And their worth is a function of their values.

In older terminology, military analysts spoke of "the will to battle," an imponderable that has more than once outweighed firepower.⁹ In less disciplined form, this differential evaluation of submission can appear as a culture's joy in violence, a theme observable in Plains Indian cultures, Norse sagas, the Song of Roland, and Arab conquests in the early Mohammedan period. Such an evaluation makes the threat of violence less costly, and the cost of submission higher. It therefore affects the calculation of alternative costs in a wide range of control decisions, not alone those affecting liberty.

Thus, any calculation of how successful a control effort by force will be, or how

⁹ Hackett refers to a General Mike West who was in Washington as part of the British government's Liaison Staff, and asked the official in charge of a U.S. Army war game how many men ran away on either side. "None," was the surprised reply. "In that case," said the general, "the result was worthless." All battles are decided by the numbers who run away and by nothing else. (Hackett, 1969:167).

likely a violation of a rule will be, must include the following variables, which have more often been stated in analyses of criminal violations:¹⁰

(1) How observable is the person or group violating the rules?

In civil liberties actions, this visibility is extremely high; but of course in criminal behavior it is likely to be low. In concrete terms, the question is, how likely is the person to be caught?

(2) How much force can the violator command, relative to the amount commanded by those who seek control?

In criminal activities, the police and citizenry command overwhelming force in a public confrontation, and over a longer run, though of course in a specific confrontation the criminal is likely to use counterforce where he believes he can get away with it over a short run, or because other people are not around. With reference to many business regulations, the business man knows he cannot command much force if matters proceed to a genuine confrontation; but he may hope by persuasion, bribery, or friendship to avoid such a conflict.

(3) How high is the evaluation set by either party on winning?

Policemen do not set a high evaluation on stopping gambling or prostitution, but care greatly about punishing anyone who kills a policeman. The South African government sets a high evaluation on repressing blacks; while American Colonials were willing to risk the punishment for treason, for in their evaluation the cost of submitting to the British government was too high.

Intuitively we would guess that the likelihood of resistance, whether in the form of criminal activity, peaceable business calculations about obeying a tax or import law, or a battle in war, is a function of the forces perceived to be available, multiplied by the contingency of being observed (which may be nearly 100% in battle, but .001% in a crime), multiplied by their evaluation of the goal.

Next, from this result must be subtracted the opposing group's or person's weighting of

their forces, multiplied by their evaluation of the goal. Then, the greater the first figure is than the second, the greater the likelihood of disobedience or violation.

Such a formal, hypothetical calculation is of course a statement at the beginning of an action sequence; and the calculations are based on the realities as each perceives them. One or both may be incorrect in these estimates, but they are constantly recalculated at each succeeding step. Thus, a businessman may decide to violate a governmental regulation in the belief that ultimately he can win a court case, or that the government has no great interest in the matter, but change his decision when his lawyer tells him he is wrong. Such a formal calculation then may be stated as follows:

$$(\text{vis})(f)(\text{val}) > (\text{val})(f)$$

where vis = visibility

f = perceived available forces, including those which may be elicited from other groups or people

val = evaluation of the goal

In addition, time discounts may be entered into such formulations, since the amount of force we can muster immediately may be low, as when we are arrested illegally, but ultimately high, as when we obtain an effective lawyer and bring a suit against the offender. People in groups vary substantially in their evaluations of immediate risks versus ultimate victory; and indeed social stability rests to some extent on the fact that most people discount heavily a future victory in a force conflict, and thus will not continue to resist control for long.

In the foregoing analysis, we have concentrated on the types of force structures in which overt force is *less* frequent, i.e., where the steps to be taken before overt force is used are many, and rarely all taken, because one or the other party understands what the eventual outcome will be, and perceives that the patterns protected by potential force are viewed as simply a reflection of the structure of social reality, rather than as an implicit threat. That analysis can also be turned to the other end of the scale, where overt force is more common, and the steps taken before its use are few. An extreme case is of course the political system of terror, whose control patterns differ slightly in structure but greatly in the values of the parameters. Although I have given some attention to this process in unpublished work, time does not permit me to discuss it (Kogon, 1949; Moore, 1954; Walter, 1969; Mendelstam, 1970).

¹⁰ Such a general formulation points up the quasi rationality of the decision process in criminality. With some obvious modifications, and again with fair accurate knowledge on the part of the participant, it can be applied to the dropping out of slum youngsters. On the "rationality" of violence, see Goode (1969) and Strodbeck and Short (1964). We ignore here the still more fundamental processes, most often treated in radical critiques, by which certain types of acts are defined as crime and thus their perpetrators as criminal.

In the remainder of the paper, I should, however, like to consider a set of cases between these two extremes, by presenting some hypotheses that focus on overt force. These are drawn from more extended analyses, but I shall try to make them as clear as I can in briefer form. That is, I will be laconic, but I hope not cryptic.

1. The less the value consensus within a group, the more efficacious is overt force, as against other resources of reward and punishment, especially prestige or friendship. On the other hand, the less the consensus, the less stable is the rule or command likely to be, if the physical force exercised by a commander or ruler weakens temporarily. Force is more useful, since the group lacks direction, until it can agree on some set of goals; and it will therefore not agree on the goals set by the ruler. On the other hand, because they agree on no alternative set of goals, they will show less resistance to force.

Few will back the ruler's authority if it is challenged, because they do not share his goals or values; and of course no organization of subordinates would arise to support him. On the other hand, it is less likely that subordinates can organize, since they do not have collective goals or shared values, except in their desire to kill or depose the leader. This situation has roughly characterized Latin America, where the masses were typically not united in values, and could only unite to unseat a leader or simply watch while a set of opposing forces engaged in battle, participating as little as possible (Goode, 1973).

2. The greater the value discrepancy between the rulers and the ruled—note that the previous proposition simply referred to a general lack of consensus in a group—the less effort the leaders will invest in a program to socialize the ruled or to use other social control variables such as friendship, money, or prestige. Instead, they will use overt force and strong threats of it. Consequently, in a conquest it is not likely that the ruled will ever willingly be incorporated into the conqueror's system. One of the few exceptions is Rome, but note that Rome gradually extended the advantages of Roman citizenship to an ever increasing set of groups and tribes. By contrast, even over

long periods of time most conquests have failed, in that the conquerors were eventually thrown out, and the conquered not assimilated into their system of values (Goode, 1961).

3. The higher the level of management tasks to be accomplished, the less efficacious is a strong component of overt force. It is less efficient because it requires, relative to the output, a greater or closer supervision if the worker is unwilling; and in turn the worker is almost always unwilling if much overt force is used. There are too many junctures and phases where slackness and sabotage are not visible, in contrast with simpler tasks. Of course, as we know, scientists can be made to work at modest task levels under threat of overt force; but I remind you that even the scientists depicted in Solzhenitzin's *The Inner Circle* were given far greater privileges than ordinary prisoners, and viewed themselves as lucky. Correspondingly a strong component of overt force is more efficient when the task is simpler, and there is no need for long periods of nonsupervision.

The above relationship has been noted by many analysts; but we may now consider an unnoted corollary, that the greater the component of overt force, the less the managerial costs in dollars and time, even though the task must be less sophisticated. In concrete terms, eight or ten guards can be used to supervise the work of a hundred or more agricultural workers. Note in this connection that had the feudal lord of the manor tried to elicit maximum productivity from his serfs, he would also have had to spend far more time and energy in management. He would have had to plan more, and he could not have devoted as much time to falconry, stag hunting, and other courtly pleasures.

4. Because the use of force is generally deprecated, the greater the approximation to using overt force on others, the more likely that those who do so will develop and offer moral justifications for using it. Moreover, experimentation in social psychology has reported that when observers see that an individual has suffered, or has been made the victim in an experiment, they are more likely to deprecate him or her, or feel that he or she has deserved the mis-

fortune (Berkowitz, 1969:98 *et passim*; Berscheid and Walter, 1967).

5. The greater the likelihood that force is used overtly by authorities, the more likely it will be viewed by those authorities and outsiders as necessary and therefore approved. Note that this view is taken when force is used by stronger on weaker parties, as by parents on children; policemen on adolescents; on prisoners as against workers; Marine trainees as against Navy recruits; felons as against misdemeanants; lower classes as against upper classes; blacks as against whites; and so on. It is, then, approved more when used on those who command less overt force or force threat and on those who are thought to require it more.¹¹

6. Those segments of the population on whom the use of overt force by authorities is more approved because other means are thought not to be available or efficacious, may in fact respond to other means; but the society or its ruling groups typically disapprove of such de-escalation. They view the costs of getting conformity as too high to them in prestige, money, or affection, compared with the cost of using force. They may even refuse to consider that their policies are unwise. They believe the cost of using overt force on such groups is relatively low, since they doubt they can gain their allegiance. Presumably, public opinion surveys might test this hypothesis. I am of course suggesting that this widespread "folk sociological belief" may be wrong, but people do act in this fashion.

7. When an individual or group uses overt force on the more advantaged segments of the population, who are generally thought to require no force since they usually cooperate anyway, others will disapprove and withdraw their force-threat backing unless it is shown that the group's violation (typically, some protest) was greater than the conflict situation justified. When authorities use overt force on more advantaged people, they must argue persuasively in its favor, or they will suffer a range of reprisals from

social disapproval to the loss of their jobs.

8. Let me offer a final proposition, focused again on overt force. People lose prestige, i.e., gain disapproval, the more they apply force in situations where acts are thought to be properly guided by values, norms, or shared goals: e.g., sit-ins or robberies. By contrast, those who use force in situations already defined as potentially violent will not lose as much esteem. Thus, one loses more prestige by fighting in a business office than in a lower class bar or a slum. The slave overseer lost more respect for brutality on a long-settled or conquered plantation than on one newly carved from the wilderness. A peace officer in a middle class suburb loses more respect for using violence, than did the frontier sheriff.

This relationship has a corollary: social anger, hostility, or deprecation directed against an individual increases the more that individual proves by resistance that conformity and stability in a social institution are maintained by overt force. That is, by compelling others to use overt force to gain compliance the resisters prove that some people feel little moral commitment to the system, or feel that it is very unjust. An extreme case of course is the violent reaction of slave owners to slave rebellions, but note recent student riots and sit-ins.

FINAL REMARKS

In proposing the systematic study of force as a set of control processes, I have moved from considering large-scale structures to smaller units, and from situations in which overt force is very much in the background, to those where it plays a prominent part. I have done so not merely to meet in part the challenge I have offered, to share the task, but also to show that this general theoretical orientation can generate testable hypotheses that will further our understanding of social structures.

I have offered several conceptual clarifications, notably abandoning the loose term "power," and analytically separating the main realms or types of control processes, i.e., force, prestige, wealth, and affection.

I have pointed out some methodological problems, most importantly, that those who are moved by force may not know that they are. However, not only is that problem al-

¹¹ This attitude has been typical of the "native" Americans toward the latest wave of immigrants, and toward the blacks at all periods of U.S. history.

ready widespread in existing analyses of "power," but we are more likely to try to solve these problems when we see that this approach helps in developing interesting propositions. In accord with that hope, I have tried to develop several such hypotheses.

I should like to close with a few, by no means all, of my prejudices about social structures. Like other people's they may be empirically incorrect in part, yet they may lead to uncovering relationships we might otherwise overlook.

I have already referred to one of these, the working guess that a phenomenon may have important consequences, or may be a crucial element in the social structure, though rarely observed; and indeed its rarity may suggest how important it is that the social processes keep it in check.

Let me suggest a few more. Although I applaud the kindly bias of modern social analysts who argue that rewards are powerful in eliciting desirable behavior from others, while punishments confuse or hinder one's efforts (Church, 1963:369-402; Solomon, 1964:239-53; Boe and Church, 1968; Campbell and Church, 1969), I believe that research will increasingly disclose the powerful effect of punishment in inducing conformity, and even change in values. Correspondingly, although I too deprecate the use of overt force, the historical record shows that regimes with even a fairly high component of overt force can be stable for a long period; and when force patterns are embedded in the system of understandings about reality that people share, overt force can be efficacious indeed. This embeddedness need not be based on moral consensus, or a belief that overt force is just. However, precisely how we come to accept that embeddedness should be a focus of our inquiries.

Next, people on whom overt force is used, or who feel its threat severely, can better judge its efficacy than those whose privileges are supported by it. In line with this prejudice, I suggest that although the imposition of an unwanted system, regime, or control pattern on a population almost always requires overt force, we cannot deduce from observing the use of a low amount of force that all or most subordinates approve the

system, or share its values. Correspondingly, those who are disadvantaged, whose traits or talents are little rewarded, do not and historically have not accepted this arrangement as just and right. If they accept it at times, they do not affirm it, and feel little commitment to it.

Finally, the past decade exhibits a worldwide revolutionary temper, in which the disadvantaged have increasingly come to perceive, and to articulate, that much of the social structure is not only unjust and can be changed, but is also held in place by force, wielded by human beings. Thus, they have come to be less willing to comply with its rules. One might, then, as a challenge to rulers everywhere, point out that we can in fact test their claim that their system is based on justice and on people's allegiance to it, by reducing the use of physical force to buttress it. Thus my final prejudice: that system which requires the least physical force would more closely approximate justice than any we now know.

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